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The Making of the Clean Air Act
BRIGHAM DANIELS,† ANDREW P. FOLLETT,† & JOSHUA DAVIS†
The 1970 Clean Air Act is arguably Congress’ most important environmental enactment. Since it
became law fifty years ago, much could be and has been said about how it has changed both the
physical environment and the contours of environmental law. Much less, however, has been
written on the genesis of the Act itself. Where its history is discussed, it is often segmented or
heavily summarized.
In this Article, we take on the story of how the Act came to be as well as how early enforcement
practices cemented its importance in the legal landscape. To do so, we rely upon an
unprecedented analysis and synthesis of previously underexplored strands of the story,
incorporating many unmined sources and original research. This story weaves together the
contributions of officials and staff in the Nixon Administration, Congress, and the judiciary to
provide what is hoped to be an integrated, meaningful, and readable account of the making of the
Clean Air Act.

† Professor of law, BYU Law School. The original histories, documents, and interviews found in this
Article are the product of nearly eight years of his original research. The primary and secondary sources Daniels
has assembled tell a larger story of the birth of environmental law than can be found in this Article, and he
intends to take the issue up in a future book. For the helpful comments offered on previous drafts of the larger
project, Daniels wishes to thank the participants of the 2019 UCLA Environmental Colloquium, 2019
Environmental Law Professors Works in Progress Series, 2018 CUNY Law School Environmental Law
Presentation, 2017 Environmental Workshop co-sponsored by Colorado, Yale, Duke, and UCLA law schools,
as well as the participants of the 2018 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation’s Natural Resource Teachers’
Conference, the 2017 Vermont Law School Environmental Colloquium, and an internal work-in-progress at
BYU Law School. Daniels particularly thanks Jim Salzman, Jed Purdy, Ann Carlson, Alex Camacho, Carol
Rose, Monika Ehrman, Blake Hudson, William Boyd, Jonas Monast, Joel Mintz, Rebecca Bratspies, Jessica
Owley, Justin Pidot, Doug Kysar, and Sarah Krakoff. He also recognizes the thoughtful comments of two valued
colleagues who have since passed on, John Nagle and Fred Cheever. Daniels also thanks the many research
assistants who have helped organize and transcribe the original research materials cited in this Article. We also
appreciate the excellent work of the editors of the Hastings Law Journal who collectively improved the article
through their diligence.
† J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School ‘23.
† J.D. Candidate ‘23.
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INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, as the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments passed through
Congress, Senator Eugene McCarthy captured the progressive spirit of the era
when he stated that clean air seemed to represent “an issue that’s better than
motherhood.”1 Indeed in 1970, the environment as a whole was “the golden
child, the exclusive and favorite national concern.”2 One polemic from the era
opined that “the businessman-industrialist awaits in frightened expectation; the
activist-conservationist in childlike frenetic excitation.”3 In fact, White House
polling data from the period reveals that environmental protection was one of
the biggest concerns on the minds of the American people, only trailing behind
the Vietnam War and the state of the economy.4
Air pollution, the budding environmental movement’s “God and
motherhood”5 issue, was front and center, and the legislation process of the
Clean Air Act (“the Act”) best captured the bipartisan zeitgeist and political
urgency of the time. It is hard to overstate how important the passage of the
Clean Air Act has been for the evolution of environmental law—before the
Clean Air Act, environmental law as we know it today was hardly a recognized
discipline of study.6 In fact, nothing that could be characterized as meaningful
pollution-control law by modern standards could be found in U.S. Code before
1970.7 Congress crafted and put to the test many of the most innovative aspects
of U.S. environmental law, several of which would later be replicated in the suite
of laws that would come to comprise the core of American environmental law.8
1. Memorandum from Leon Billings, former Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Env’t Subcomm., to Personal Files 1
(on file with authors as Muskie 1–15).
2. RUSSELL E. TRAIN, POLITICS, POLLUTION, AND PANDAS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL MEMOIR 201 (2003)
(quoting Linda Ba Thung, an environmental reporter).
3. Joseph H. Thibodeau, Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act of 1970: Panacea or Pandora’s Box,
48 J. URB. L. 579, 598 (1971).
4. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to President Richard
Nixon (June 29, 1971) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-70) (including polling data from Benham poll).
5. Editorial, Environment in Politics, SARASOTA (FLA.) HERALD-TRIB. (on file with authors as Nixon 416).
6. James L. Huffman, The Past and Future of Environmental Law, 30 ENVTL. L. 23, 27–28 (2000)
(explaining that the first environmental law journal was not introduced until 1969 at Lewis and Clark, and that
it took about a decade before environmental law was generally offered across the country); Richard J. Lazarus,
Environmental Scholarship and the Harvard Difference, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 341 (1999)
(“Environmental law did not emerge as a distinct category of legal scholarship until approximately 1973.”); J.B.
Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE L.J. 975, 982 (2013) (“The very
term ‘environmental law’ did not even exist before 1969.”).
7. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 221, 223 n.2 (“The first major federal environmental case, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), was decided in 1965. The first modern federal
environmental statute, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006), was
signed into law on January 1, 1970.”).
8. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 79–84 (2004) (calling the 1970s a “new
era” for environmental protection and detailing numerous legal innovations that emerged during that time);
Daniel Riesel, Forecasting Significant Air Act Implementation Issues: Permitting and Enforcement, 14
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Although environmental protection would not retain its untouchable
political popularity for long,9 the legacy of the Clean Air Act is difficult to
overstate; it has demonstrably altered the chemical and material composition of
American air, particularly in heavily populated urban areas.10 These gains are
more than blue skies—clean air has spared many, especially in historically
marginalized communities, from illness and premature death.11 The Clean Air
Act, including through later rounds of amendments,12 has been a primary tool
used by the United States to combat acid rain,13 and, in the last decade, has been
seen by many, including the Obama Administration, as a potential tool for
regulating carbon emissions in response to global climate change.14
We echo the assertion of Senator John Sherman Cooper, who helped author
the Act, that the Clean Air Act may be among the “most significant measure[s]
in the domestic sense of legislation in any congress.”15 Its importance justifies
this golden-anniversary investigation into its genesis and the people who have
made it. In this Article, we argue that the content and legacy of the Clean Air
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 129 (1996) (“The Clean Air Act (CAA) was the original or flagship statute of the
1970 environmental revolution. All environmental statutes subsequent and prior to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) are closely based on the 1970 CAA
pattern.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Bruce M. Kramer, The 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Federalism in
Action or Inaction?, 6 TEX. TECH L. REV. 47, 47 (1974) (“The Clean Air Act, as it now stands, is a pioneering
document that reflects tremendous credit on the skill, wisdom and foresight of its draftsmen. However, as a
pioneering document, it incorporates many previously untested provisions” (quoting Arthur C. Stern,
Strengthening the Clean Air Act, J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N, 1019, 1020 (1973)).
9. See infra Subpart IV.B.
10. See, e.g., Michael Greenstone, Estimating Regulation-Induced Substitution: The Effect of the Clean Air
Act on Water and Ground Pollution, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 442, 443–47 (2003).
11. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Castle & Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Standards, Thresholds, and the
Next Battleground of Climate Change Regulations, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1349, 1394 (2019); Samuel J. Rascoff &
Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-andSafety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1766 (2002).
12. See generally Adam Babich, Back to the Basics of Antipollution Law, 32 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2018)
(discussing the 1977 and 1990 amendments); Samuel Hays, Clean Air: From the 1970 Act to the 1977
Amendments, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 33 (1977) (same); David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statues: The Case
of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983) (discussing the 1977 Amendments extensively); Henry A.
Waxman, An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 1721 (1991) (discussing the
1990 amendments).
13. See, e.g., JAMES L. REGENS & ROBERT W. RYCROFT, THE ACID RAIN CONTROVERSY (2d prtg.1989);
Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 982 (1997); Brennan Van
Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE L.J. 2707, 2708 n.9 (1991).
14. See, e.g., Castle & Revesz, supra note 11, at 1350; Howard M. Crystal et al., Returning to Clean Air
Act Fundamentals: A Renewed Call to Regulate Greenhouse Gases Under the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) Program, 31 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 284–85 (2019); Holly Doremus & W. Michael
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful
for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 800 (2008); Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending
Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 100 (2006);
Craig N. Oren, Is the Clean Air Act at a Crossroads?, 40 ENVTL. L. 1231, 1249–54 (2010); Craig N. Oren, When
Must EPA Set Ambient Air Quality Standards? Looking Back at NRDC v. Train, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
157, 157–58 (2012); Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Does Chevron
Set the EPA Free?, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 284 (2010).
15. A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Pub.
Works, Exec. Sess. 491 (Sept. 11, 1970) (statement of Sen. John Sherman Cooper).
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Act can be fully appreciated only when supplemented with an understanding of
the political context and key players behind it. The story of the passage of the
Act would likely surprise even well-informed students of environmental legal
history: many of its most important provisions were the product of tobaccosmoke-filled, closed-door deliberations filled primarily with decided nonenvironmentalists. In fact, some of its most significant innovations, such as
national standards, came from the conservative Nixon Administration itself.
Furthermore, the dedicated early enforcement of the Act, which made it
legitimate and lasting, came by the hands of Nixon-appointees.
While there are some notable pieces of writing which deal with the Clean
Air Act’s making (a brief history is often offered when the Act is analyzed),16
the focus of existing literature rests on practical effects of the law and the
regulatory tools it created. Thus, the “told story,” which this Article
supplements, is an admittedly short tale.17
The highlights of the “told story” are as follows: In the late 1960s and early
1970s, a number of factors made environmental issues politically salient,
including the first Earth Day, the popularity of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring,
and various environmental disasters.18 Congress responded to this pressure by
trying to further environmental legislation, including revamping existing federal
pollution law.19 In 1970, President Nixon, driven by politics, attempted to claim
a share of the spotlight by calling on Congress to craft even more aggressive and
comprehensive environmental laws, including an improved Clean Air Act.20

16. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. BAILEY, CONGRESS AND AIR POLLUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN
(2000); LAZARUS, supra note 8; R. SHEP
MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); E. Donald Elliott et al.,
Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313
(1985); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014); Richard
J. Lazarus, Senator Edmund Muskies’s Enduring Legacy in the Courts, 67 ME. L. REV. 240 (2015); Robert V.
Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995);
Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial Fragment of Contemporary
History, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2375 (2000); Russell E. Train, The Environmental Record of the Nixon
Administration, 26 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 185 (1996); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 29–31 (1994); Craig N. Oren,
Clearing the Air: The McCubbins-Noll-Weingast Hypothesis and the Clean Air Act, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 80–
97 (1989).
17. We use the description of the “told story” in a descriptive and not in a derogatory way; each element
of the told story is true, descriptive, and meaningful. We recognize that much that has been told was untold
before it was written. Our hope is that this Article will likewise find a home in the “told story” and serve as
platform for others build upon.
18. Huffman, supra note 6, at 24 (“Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring was a key catalyst for widespread public
concern about the health impacts of various human activities.”).
19. Elliot et al., supra note 16, at 321 (noting the complex, “more subtle,” and decentralized sort of
influence the grassroots movement exerted on policymaking institutions, while still recognizing the practical
effects of such mass-movement pressure).
20. See FLIPPEN, supra note 16, at 76–77; LAZARUS, supra note 8; Elliot et al., supra note 16, at 324, 333–
39 (suggesting that Muskie and President Nixon were caught in a “politicians’ dilemma,” where passage of the
Clean Air Act of 1970 took “a form which was more stringent than either of them would have preferred” as a
THE USA (1998); J. BROOKS FLIPPEN, NIXON AND THE ENVIRONMENT
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Senator Muskie, propelled by presidential ambitions, upped the ante again by
pushing through Congress the remarkably comprehensive 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments.21
One deterrent to expanding beyond these key elements of the told story is
undoubtedly the Act’s inherent complexity. In overcoming this barrier, this
Article takes advantage of the passage of the last half-century, retrospectively
identifying the most critical aspects of the law and, in turn, telling the story of
the making of these portions of the Act, including those provisions which have
demonstrated the greatest effects on both air quality and environmental law.
Because we want to recount and analyze the Act’s history in a comprehensive
and readable way, we blend the told story with previously underexplored
perspectives, many growing out of unpublished primary sources and original
research.
First, in Part I, we explore the political environment of the Clean Air Act,
including the beginnings of the environmental movement in general and the
active, and at-times unappreciated, role that the Nixon White House had in
shaping the early Clean Air Act. We set the scene for the 1970 environmental
thrust by outlining how the environment became the “God and motherhood
issue,” and how it was adopted by Nixon despite mixed opinions from various
members of his Administration, including the President himself. In particular,
we note the significant role the Administration played in coaxing a strong,
federal Clean Air Act from Congress and how its proposals affected the
trajectory of the bill.
Part II explores the legislative process of the Clean Air Act, focusing
primarily on the Senate, in order to demonstrate how key players in the Air and
Water Pollution Subcommittee transformed earlier air pollution legislation by
incorporating novel policy tools. Specific actions taken by Chair Edmund
Muskie illuminate and justify the generally accepted claim that Muskie was the
primary mover of the bill. More significantly, however, while still recognizing
Muskie’s primary role in the legislation, we tease out the undervalued role and
contributions of other members of the Public Works Committee and Air and
Water Pollution Subcommittee. We pay particular focus to the genesis of

result of a kind of “policy escalation”), quoted in Robert F. Blohmquist, “To Stir Up Public Interest”: Edmund
S. Muskie and the U.S. Senate Special Subcommittee’s Water Pollution Investigations and Legislative Activities,
1963–66—A Case Study in Early Congressional Environmental Policy Development, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
1, 13 n.42 (1997); Joel K. Goldstein, Edmund S. Muskie: The Environmental Leader and Champion, 67 ME. L.
REV. 226, 226 (2015); Robert Gottlieb, The Next Environmentalism: How Movements Respond to the Changes
that Elections Bring—From Nixon to Obama, 14 ENVTL. HIST. 298, 302 (2009); Alfred Marcus, Environmental
Protection Agency, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 267, 267–68 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980); David Vogel, A
Big Agenda, 11 WILSON Q. 50, 57–58 (1987).
21. See Elliott et al., supra note 16, cited in David Gerard & Lester B. Lave, Implementing TechnologyForcing Policies: The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Introduction of Advanced Automotive Emissions
Controls in the United States, 72 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 761, 766 (2005). Muskie is
often, but not always, credited alone. For exceptions, see Leon G. Billings, Edmund S. Muskie: A Man with a
Vision, 67 ME. L. REV. 234, 235 (2015).
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technology forcing (composed of statutory deadlines and standards), shared
federalism, citizen suits, and mandatory performance by government agencies.
In Part III, we build on the explorations of Part II as the story of the Clean
Air Act continues through conference committee and its signing, which is
highlighted by a power struggle between Senator Muskie and President Nixon.
This Part complements the building narrative of the earlier legislative process
and creates a through-line to the period of the early Environmental Protection
Agency’s regulatory programs.
Part IV continues into the early enforcement era (reaching the first years of
the Ford Administration) and argues that key decisions made by early EPA
Administrators William Ruckelshaus and Russell Train, sometimes upon the
intervention of the courts (and usually with constant congressional oversight),
were crucial in defining the efficacy and trajectory of the Clean Air Act. Thus,
Part IV extends our analysis outside of the Congress and considers the Act as it
exists today as the product of all branches of government.
I. NIXON RESPONDS TO POPULAR DEMAND FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
This Part details the rise to prominence of the environment as a political
issue, as well as President Richard Nixon’s response and actions, which we
recognize were driven largely by political necessity. Gradual momentum for
political change on the environmental front began more than a decade before the
passage of the Clean Air Act and greatly accelerated in the last years of the
1960s.22 Congress began flirting with federalizing air pollution control as early
as 1955 in the form of the inaptly named Air Pollution Control Act (“the
APCA”).23 Although an important first step for Congress, the two-page APCA
was extremely modest in scope. Rather than focus on regulation or the control
of air pollution per se, the Act attempted to facilitate research, develop future
technical means to reduce pollution, collect data, disseminate research findings,
and offer assistance to states that volunteered to do something about local air
pollution.24 Ultimately, the APCA lacked any language to affirmatively compel
governmental action on air pollution.25

22. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 27; Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 301.
23. Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L No. 159-360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
24. Id. at 322–23, §§ 3–5; see also CLAYTON D. FORSWALL & KATHRYN E. HIGGINS, ENVTL. AND ENERGY
SYS. INST., CLEAN AIR ACT IMPLEMENTATION IN HOUSTON: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1970–2005, at 17
(2005) (discussing how the EPA “promulgated its own plan to get Houston into attainment” when it determined
that Texas’s state implementation plan would not meet the ozone standard).
25. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.03, Lexis Advance (database updated Oct. 2019). After all,
even though this enactment did not have much in the way of “teeth,” so to speak, before any clean air statutes
were formed, all that existed was the common law and some modest state statutes, most of them aimed at air
pollution that created some statutorily defined nuisance. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24200–25946
(1976) (repealed 1986); SCOTT HAMILTON DEWEY, DON’T BREATHE THE AIR: AIR POLLUTION AND U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, 1945–1970 (2000).
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In 1963, with Senator Ed Muskie now the first Chair of the Pollution
Subcommittee, Congress took the APCA one step further by passing a federal
Clean Air Act.26 This enactment provided the federal government a regulatory
role in air pollution control for the first time, though it was a relatively minor
role that the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) exercised with great discretion.27 In particular, it authorized the
regulation of federal stationary sources and accelerated research on the adverse
health effects of air pollution.28 Like the 1955 enactment, it was rooted in a
strong presumption of unchallenged state primacy on regulating air pollution.29
The 1965 Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act,30 which laid the foundation for
the 1970 Clean Air Act’s Title II, broadened the scope of regulated pollutants
and acknowledged the automobile’s place in the complex system of air pollution.
To his credit, Muskie was early to the game of strong, dramatic air pollution
legislation: as early as 1964 he described efforts to curb air pollution as a “war,”
for example—language that wouldn’t become more mainstream until the
following decade.31
Muskie’s eagerness went unmatched in Congress, however,32 and it was
not until the 1967 Air Quality Act that the nation-wide struggle against air
pollution began “in earnest” in the eyes of Congress.33 The steps that this
enactment took seem negligible in comparison with what would follow three
years later; still, the 1967 Act succeeded in filling technical and knowledge gaps
that earlier research-oriented bills sought (but ultimately failed) to fill. Similarly,
although the Air Quality Act conformed to the pattern of previous amendments
in incrementally deepening federal authority over air pollution, it maintained
virtually unqualified state control of regulation and upheld variable standards in
different regions of the country rather than a uniform national standard.34
Shortly after the 1967 Act, however, the political atmosphere shifted
dramatically, setting the stage for a period of punctuated evolution in the law,
which would match Muskie’s rhetoric and legislative aspirations. The
environment did not seize attention right away, however, because more
immediate social issues were reaching their own boiling points: Civil Rights and
26. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). It may be worth mentioning that this is the first
Clean Air Act in name; thus, what we refer to as the Clean Air Act throughout this Article might be more fully
referred to as the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments.
27. Id. § 5, 77 Stat. at 396–98.
28. Id. § 7(a), 77 Stat. at 399; id. § 3, 77 Stat. at 394–95.
29. See Id. § 4(a), 77 Stat. at 395; id. § 5(b), 77 Stat. at 396 (“[M]unicipal, State, and interstate action to
abate air pollution shall be encouraged and shall not be displaced by Federal enforcement action except as
otherwise provided”).
30. Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965).
31. 110 CONG. REC. 6261 (1964).
32. See infra Subpart II.B.
33. Clean Air Act Amendments: Hearings on the Air Quality Act of 1967 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1967).
34. Robert Martin & Lloyd Symington, A Guide to the Air Quality Act of 1967, 33 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROBS. 239, 243 (1968).
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anti-Vietnam protests, and the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and
Robert Kennedy still dominated the national stage.35 Despite considerable
movement in Congress, such as a Joint House-Senate Colloquium on the issue
of the environment and a national environmental policy,36 the environment was
not a widely recognizable or coherent political issue to the public, and was thus
not a campaign issue for either party to any meaningful extent as late as the ‘68
Presidential race.37
Perhaps due to social unrest and public cynicism regarding the federal
government, Congress began to coalesce in a bipartisan manner around many
issues of public import,38 something that probably worked in favor in Congress
addressing air pollution. The cooperation found in Congress stood in stark
contrast to the whirlwind surrounding it—Washington, D.C. was the eye of a
storm of unrest and divisiveness: the Senate and House Office Buildings, as well
as the Capitol itself, were sandbagged, and much of the city was engulfed in
riots.39 Protestors occupied government buildings and badgered congressional
representatives for their failure to act meaningfully,40 and smoke from
congressional representatives’ cigars competed for the air in the halls of the
public congressional offices with that of demonstrators’ marijuana.41
35. For comprehensive discussions of the events of 1968, see MICHAEL A. COHEN, AMERICAN
MAELSTROM: THE 1968 ELECTION AND THE POLITICS OF DIVISION (2016); LEWIS L. GOULD, 1968: THE
ELECTION THAT CHANGED AMERICA (1993); MICHAEL NELSON, RESILIENT AMERICA: ELECTING NIXON IN 1968,
CHANNELING DISSENT, AND DIVIDING GOVERNMENT (2014); DENNIS WAINSTOCK, ELECTION YEAR 1968: THE
TURNING POINT (2012).
36. See Joint House-Senate Colloquium to Discuss a Nat’l Policy for the Environment: Hearing on Before
the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs & H. Comm. on Sci. & Astronautics, 90th Cong. (1968) [hereinafter
Joint House-Senate Colloquium].
37. See FLIPPEN, supra note 16, at 19–20; Interview with Tom Jorling, former Minority Counsel, U.S.
Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, in Saranac Lake, N.Y. (Sept. 21, 2018). It is worth noting that although the
environment issue was not hotly contested, it was not totally absent, either. For example, Nixon, made a
statement addressing potential efforts to improve the urban environment—many of which might be considered
environmental initiatives. See Statement of Richard M. Nixon, Republican Presidential Nominee, Statement in
Miami, Fl. (Oct. 13, 1968) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-120) (“[W]e have been promised rebirth of our
cities—promised improved transportation, pure air, clean water, and safe, quiet streets. Billions of our tax dollars
were spent trying to keep those promises. But they were not kept. Our air is still fouled by pollutants. Our rivers
and lakes are still unclean. . . . All pollution in one form or another violates the rights of individuals. Everyone
has the right to be protected from bodily harm by others. And every poisonous particle that lodges in our lungs,
every pieces of trash that litters our streets, every jarring noise that assails our eardrums was caused by
someone. . . . Up to now, those who pollute have been largely subsidized at the expense of our physical and
mental health. This can no longer continue. . . . [B]y failing to respond earlier to the challenge posed by new
technology—[government] has been a passive, condoning partner in the creation of polluted cities.”).
38. On the strong bipartisan effect, see Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation
of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 323 (1991) (noting that the average vote in
favor of federal environmental legislation during this decade was “seventy-six to five in the Senate and 331 to
thirty in the House”).
39. See BEN W. GILBERT, TEN BLOCKS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE: ANATOMY OF THE WASHINGTON RIOTS
OF 1968 (1968); Denise Kersten Wills, “People Were Out of Control”: Remembering the 1968 Riots,
WASHINGTONIAN (Apr. 1, 2008), https://www.washingtonian.com/2008/04/01/people-were-out-of-controlremembering-the-1968-riots/; Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
40. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
41. Id.
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This political climate acted as a catalyst to the developing grassroots
environmental movement.42 Many members of Congress were eager to appease
a growingly skeptical and divided public by demonstrating that they could
effectively recognize and advance the public interest through flashy new
legislative packages.
Some members of Congress saw an opportunity enact tougher legislation
on the environment, for example, seeking to atone for “a sad and frustrating
history of weak-kneed inaction,” believing that they had “been charged with
protecting the divine right of every citizen to breathe clean air.”43 A few months
before movement on the Clean Air Act began, Senator Henry Jackson similarly
justified the National Environmental Policy Act. A “primary purpose” of that
Act, he said, “is to restore public confidence in the Federal Government’s
capacity to achieve important public purposes and objectives and at the same
time maintain and enhance the quality of the environment.”44
Vietnam, civil rights, and Soviet tension may all have been out of reach,
but cleaning the air seemed to be attainable, and gains could be measured and
seen. But for this cynicism and distrust of the government, it is highly unlikely
that the environmental movement itself, growing since the early 1960s, would
have resulted in the strong iteration of the Clean Air Act which we now have.45
At the turn of the decade, a perfect storm of events focused the nation’s attention
on the problem of environmental quality in particular, channeling general unrest
into new vessels of “ecology”: an unprecedented environmental disaster arising
from the Santa Barbara oil spill.46 As the nation began to focus on the
42. Elliott, et al., supra note 16, at 321.
43. HOUSE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM., at 7 (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM.
ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 116 (1974).
44. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 8 (1969); see also 115 CONG.
REC. 19,008 (1969) (covering the consideration of a bill amending the National Environmental Policy Act, which
provides the purposes and policy goals of the Act).
45. Interview with Tom Jorling, former Minority Counsel, U.S. Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, in Provo,
Utah (Feb. 11, 2019). But see Christopher D. Ahlers, Origins of the Clean Air Act: A New Interpretation, 45
ENVTL. L. 75, 77–78 (2015) (arguing that the Clean Air Act arose not necessarily because of events of 1970 but
rather due to a gradual, if not inevitable, evolution of federal air regulations from 1955 to 1970; in other words,
arguing that the 1970 Act does not represent “punctuated evolution,” so to speak).
46. Leslie Carothers, Upholding EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gases: The Precautionary Principle
Redux, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 683, 717 (2014) (“When EPA’s health-based lead regulations were undergoing final
interagency review in the fall of 1973, long lines were forming at service stations as a result of the Arab oil
embargo following the Yom Kippur War. . . . As EPA Deputy Administrator John Quarles recalled in his
firsthand account of EPA’s battle with White House staff in November 1973, one of the major lead processors
ran full-page newspaper ads in the Washington Post and the New York Times claiming that the rules would waste
one million barrels of oil per day. Although this wild claim was never substantiated, EPA agreed with the staff
of the Office of Management and Budget to change the lead reduction schedule to reduce the first-year impacts
and extend the final compliance date, while achieving a slightly greater level of total lead reduction.” (footnotes
omitted)); Craig N. Oren, Comment, Struggling for Context: An Appraisal of “Struggling for Air,” 46
ENVTL. L. REP. 10838, 10842 (2016) (“The Arab oil embargo of 1973 . . . . led to many states abandoning their
ambitious goals for emission reduction” (footnote omitted)); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution
Control Law: What’s Worked; What’s Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1602 (1991) (“The
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environment, more ecological problems, previously ignored, also became
apparent.
During this initial “honeymoon era” of the environment,47 as it would later
be called by some in the Nixon White House, “pollution and ecology” enjoyed
its widest base. Polling data from the period illustrate the transformation and
show a degree of public support, which might seem unimaginable in a modern
political atmosphere.
In May 1971, just a few months after the Clean Air Act was signed,
Opinion Research Corporation’s Tom Benham conducted a poll for internal use
by the White House.48 The President’s adviser charged with heading up
environmental policy, an environmentally-concerned Domestic Policy Council
member named John Whitaker,49 wrote a memo to Nixon that cited this poll and
tried to make a case that the President should try his hand in the environmental
arena.
Benham’s polling clearly demonstrates the prominence of air and water
pollution as an issue, being designated “very important” by seventy-nine percent
of respondents—up near the top or even higher than problems of combating
crime, holding down inflation, or managing unemployment.50 Seventy-four
percent of respondents said that government spending should be increased in
response to air and water pollution—the second highest such rating.51
Even more dramatically, the polling data revealed that seventy-seven
percent of the public favored closing down any factory which “continually
violates laws regulating pollution, and 88% of the public similarly favored heavy
fines against companies who continually violate pollution control laws.”52 A
strong plurality of Americans (forty-five percent) even went so far as to insist
that sources of pollution be shut down even at the expense of the jobs of “many
of their neighbors.”53 Set against a background of public ignorance just a few

program to protect areas already having clean air was bogged down by EPA’s failure to implement the prevention
of significant deterioration (PSD) program. At the same time, unemployment had grown to nine percent, there
was double digit inflation, and the nation was struggling with the aftermath of the 1973 Arab oil embargo. It was
in this context that Congress, in 1977, attempted to redirect EPA toward achieving the goals of the CAA”
(footnote omitted).); Memorandum from Russell Train, former Admin., Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Robert P. Mayo,
former Dir., Bureau of the Budget (Apr. 16, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 6-221) (“Serious students of
the environmental movement agree that the Santa Barbara oil spill was the single incident that crystallized the
amorphous concern for the environment into an international movement.”).
47. EDMUND S. MUSKIE, 92D CONG., REPORT ON S. SUBCOMM. ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION ACTIVITY
(1972) (on file with authors as Muskie 3-7).
48. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to President Richard
Nixon (June 29, 1971) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-70) (including polling data from Benham poll).
49. Whitaker’s role in the Nixon-environment push in general is difficult to overstate, although tangential
to the topic at hand and perhaps better left to other research reports.
50. Memorandum from Thomas W. Benham, former Executive Vice President, Opinion Research
Corporation, to John C. Whitaker (June 22, 1971) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-72).
51. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, supra note 48 (including polling data from Benham’s poll).
52. Id. at 3.
53. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to John D.
Ehrlichman (July 29, 1971) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-76) (including polling data from Benham’s poll).
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years prior (as well as partisan antipathy in the coming years),54 these polling
figures were and remain today dramatic.55
The broad appeal and political one-sidedness during this period thus
illuminate Gene McCarthy’s characterization of clean air and the environment
as an issue “that’s better than motherhood.”56 But Nixon had an additional
reason to worry about pollution, one that is often cited by historians of the
environmental movement—Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine—who was in
significant part responsible for much of Congress’ early environmental
enactments.57
As a result, Muskie surged in popularity as a potential Democratic
presidential candidate when the environment began to gain traction.58 As
support for Muskie grew, so did Nixon’s interest in the environment
reflexively.59 Muskie had earned the reputation as the Senate’s “Mr. Clean”60
and, unlike the rigid “law and order” Nixon who presented himself as the
political establishment’s response to insurgent counter-culture movements,
Muskie could appeal to a disillusioned youth that formed a key voting
constituency. Muskie was also later crucial in forcing “a commitment from the
Nixon Administration that the Environmental Protection Agency would be an
advocate, not an adjudicator, of environmental protection.”61
In the last half of 1969, even as Senator Gaylord Nelson announced he
would hold an Earth Day rally the following April (which would draw in nearly
one in ten Americans), Nixon prepared to make a move of his own in 1970—an
54. See Leon G. Billings, former Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Env’t Subcomm., Keynote Address at the 75th
Annual Meeting of the Missouri Water Environment Association (Mar. 22, 2004),
http://www.muskiefoundation.org/leon.missouri.html (noting the way in which the partisan divide on the
environment grew in the years following the passage of the Clean Air Act).
55. See Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, supra note 48.
56. Memorandum from Leon Billings supra note 1, at 1 (undated) (on file with authors as Muskie 1-15);
Memorandum to Files, Violation of Title II of the Clean Air Act (Nov. 13, 1972) (on file with authors as Muskie
1-51). A shift on the environment can also be demonstrated by shifting attitudes within the Administration on
the enforcement of existing air legislation:
In September of 1969, the Administration entered into a consent decree to settle a civil anti-trust [sic]
suit against the auto companies for conspiring for more than a decade to thwart development of
pollution control devices. During consideration of that suit, the Justice Department prepared a memo
recommending criminal prosecution of auto executives for collusive efforts to thwart development
of clean engine systems from 1953 through the late sixties.
Id.
57. FLIPPEN, supra note 16, at 26–27; LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 76–78; John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of
Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 242 (1990); Gottlieb supra note 20, at 302 (2009); Interview with
Leon Billings, former Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Environment Subcomm., in Washington, D.C. (July 22, 2012) (on
file with authors as Leon Billings D.C. Interview).
58. Louis Harris, Muskie Leads Nixon for ’72, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1970 (on file with authors as Muskie
4-48); Muskie Leads Kennedy in ’72 Presidential Poll, BOS. GLOBE, June 11, 1970, at 3 (on file with authors as
Muskie 4-3).
59. 1 HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., UNIV. TENN., CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y, CLEANING AMERICA’S AIR: PROGRESS
AND CHALLENGES 14 (David C. Brill ed., 2005).
60. THEO LIPPMAN, JR. & DONALD C. HANSEN, MUSKIE 119 (1971).
61. Leon G. Billings, Why Ed Muskie Mattered, 13 ENVTL. F. 63, 65 (1996).
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aggressive call to legislate environmental protection.62 Although Nixon did not
necessarily seek to beat Muskie on the environmental front (knowing it was not
feasible), he at least sought to stage a credible challenge. That Nixon and his
Administration felt considerable pressure can be seen in the President’s
directions to his staff–namely, how he used Muskie to frame environmental
initiatives.
For example, Nixon used Muskie as a reference point or sidebar for his
own staff as he organized an environmental agenda and set boundaries for new
policy—John Whitaker remembered being told by the President, “I want
environmental cleanup, but not at such a cost-benefit ratio that’s going to hurt
the economy. Don’t try to ‘out-clean’ Mr. Muskie; there’s no way you can do
it.”63 Elsewhere Whitaker noted that “[Nixon] wanted a position between the
liberal Muskie-dominated Senate Public Works and the conservative Cramerdominated House Public Works Committee.”64 Nixon’s position might also be
characterized by staff member Christopher DeMuth’s recollection of Nixon’s
disclaimer that “I’m not going to go as far as Muskie. Muskie would close down
all of American [industry]. I won’t do that.”65
Despite reservations and insistence that he would not go as far as Muskie,
Nixon made a hard push to gain green ground. On the first day of 1970, he signed
the National Environmental Policy Act and, in his accompanying statement,
proclaimed the 1970s to be the decade of the environment.66 Later that year, he
dedicated a significant part of his State of the Union Address to call for

62. See THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS RECOMMENDING A 37-POINT ADMINISTRATIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM (Feb. 10, 1970), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1498–1511 (1974); Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former
Member, Domestic Policy Council, to Christopher DeMuth, Staff Assistant to the President (Dec. 11, 1969) (on
file with authors as Nixon 2-7); Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy
Council, to John Campbell (Dec. 3, 1969) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-5); Memorandum from John C.
Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to John D. Ehrlichman (Nov. 13, 1969) (on file with
authors as Nixon 2-4); Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to
President Richard Nixon (Nov. 26, 1969) (on file with authors as Nixon 3-85); see also S. 3466, (1970)
(empowering the Secretary to propose regulations establishing nation air quality standards), reprinted in 2
COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1483 (1974);
SUMMARY OF CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 (1970) (summarizing the 1970 amendments), reprinted in
2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1496
(1974).
63. Interview by Frederick J. Graboske & Raymond H. Geselbracht with John C. Whitaker, former
Member, Domestic Policy Council, in Alexandria, VA (Dec. 30, 1987) (on file with authors as Transcribed
Interviews 2-12).
64. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, former Member, Domestic Policy Council, to President Richard
Nixon’s File (Apr. 1, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-117).
65. Interview by Frank Gannon, Richard Nixon Found., with Christopher DeMuth, Staff Assistant to
President Richard Nixon (Apr. 27, 2010) (on file with authors as Transcribed Interviews 2-10).
66. Richard M. Nixon, former President, United States, Remarks at the Signing of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (Jan. 1, 1970) (transcribed by the Richard Nixon Found.),
https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2010/01/rn-in-70-the-decade-of-the-environment/.
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environmental measures,67 including a call to make “[c]lean air, clean water,
[and] open spaces . . . [a] birthright of every American.”68 He also concluded,
“[t]hrough our years of past carelessness we incurred a debt to nature, and now
that debt is being called.”69 Nixon followed up on his high rhetoric with a more
detailed proposal in a separate “Environmental Message to Congress,”70 which
was a thirty-seven point plan to tackle the environment, many of these points
being more aggressive proposals to address air pollution than those found at the
time in Congress.
Thus, the Nixon Administration and the Democratic Congress initiated an
arms race that would last the better part of Nixon’s first term to ramp up
proposals, draft bills, and claim the issue71—creating, as a side effect, the most
comprehensive and demonstrably effective environmental legislation of the
modern era and, perhaps unintentionally, a new legal discipline.72
Just eight days after Nixon presented his environmental message to
Congress in February 1970, a new rendition of the National Air Quality
Standards Act of 1970, sponsored by twenty-nine Republicans and four
Democrats, was introduced before the Senate, incorporating Nixon’s call for the
federal government to “establish nationwide air quality standards.”73
Concurrently proposed in the House by a single Republican was a bill that
focused on large stationary sources, and another concurrently introduced bill
(sponsored by then-House Minority Leader Gerald Ford) sought to increase
regulations on cars.74
Although some involved in the process would later insist that the Senate
was already moving in the direction of national standards,75 the effects of
Nixon’s legislative proposal should not be overlooked. Congress’ existing
67. Richard Nixon, former President, United States, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 22, 1970), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-message-the-congress-the-statethe-union-2.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS RECOMMENDING A 37-POINT ADMINISTRATIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM (Feb. 10, 1970), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1505 (1974); see also S. 3466, (1970) (empowering the Secretary
to propose regulations establishing nation air quality standards), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1483 (1974); SUMMARY OF CLEAN AIR
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 (1970) (summarizing the 1970 amendments), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB.
WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1496 (1974).
71. LAZARUS, supra note 8, at 76 (referring to the Clean Air Act as a “struggle between Nixon and
Muskie”); Vogel, supra note 20, at 57 (1987) (discussing the “bidding war” that resulted in the Clean Air Act).
72. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
73. THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS RECOMMENDING A 37-POINT ADMINISTRATIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM (Feb. 10, 1970), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1505 (1974); see also S. 3466, (1970) (empowering the Secretary
to propose regulations establishing nation air quality standards), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1483 (1974).
74. H.R. 16033, 91st Cong. (1970) (introduced in the House, Feb. 18, 1970).
75. See Air Pollution Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the S.
Comm. on Pub. Works, Exec. Sess. 20 (May 6, 1970) [hereinafter Public Works Hearings].
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momentum on air pollution, carried over from 1967, which had previously
focused exclusively on expanding the regulatory range of Title II to cover noise
pollution and jets, among other things,76 was thus redirected towards remaking
the Clean Air Act on a more fundamental level by Nixon’s entry into the arena.
Nationwide standards were the catalyst for a fundamentally different Clean Air
Act. In the coming months, however, Congress would be digging far deeper than
Nixon’s call for nationwide standards.
And so, in March 1970, one month after Nixon’s address, the Senate looked
to up the ante again by introducing new efforts to amend the entire Clean Air
Act, now recognizing the “limited” objectives of the 1967 Air Quality Act;77 it
additionally raised the rhetorical stakes by asserting that “the fight against
pollution is not just a matter of cleaning up the environment but a necessity for
man’s survival,” leveraging the polemic that the executive had failed to meet
Congress’ efforts in air pollution legislation under previous law.78
II. SENATE AIR AND WATER POLLUTION SUBCOMMITTEE
It was in this climate that Congress set out to capitalize on the opportunity
by passing the 1970 Clean Air Act and thereby demonstrate its sensitivity to the
public will.79 Even in the context of Nixon’s public statements and the House’s
pressure to implement national standards, the Clean Air Act evolved
considerably in the Senate and was in large part defined by the Senate
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution (“the Subcommittee”). In order to
describe the coming-to-be of the Senate bill, in Subpart II.A, we consider the
players in the room when the Subcommittee shaped the Clean Air Act. After
introducing the Committee, we move on to highlight some players of particular
importance in shaping the Act. In Subpart II.B, we consider Senator Ed Muskie,
the primary player in Congress who influenced the substance of the Clean Air
Act. In Subpart II.C, we discuss two other members of the Committee, Senators
Howard Baker and Thomas Eagleton. Finally, we outline in Subpart II.D how
Leon Billings and Tom Jorling, Senate staff members, played a key (and often
diminished)80 role in making and strengthening the Act.

76. Introduction of Air Quality Improvement Act, S. 3229, 91st Cong. (1969), reprinted in 2 COMM. ON
PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1533 (1974).
77. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM. (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM. ON
PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 124 (1974).
78. Introduction of National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, S. 3546, 91st Cong. (1970), reprinted in
2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1470
(1974).
79. William Steif, Nader’s Raiders Take on Muskie, SCRIPPS-HOWARD (May 13, 1970) (on file with
authors as Muskie 1-34).
80. This is not to say that the role of staffers Leon Billings and Tom Jorling has been entirely ignored; see
infra note 213.
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A. THE SUBCOMMITTEE
The more Nixon-aligned House moved quickly on all of the air pollution
suggestions found in Nixon’s thirty-seven point proposal on the environment.
Many of these proposals were rolled into a single bill that was introduced on
April 27, 1970,81 and it was passed out of the House about a month later.82 The
bill then moved to the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee of the Senate
Public Works Committee. The Subcommittee acted as the primary, largely
independent, vessel for the Act, as it argued over and crafted a bill with little
influence from organized lobbies, staff would argue.83 While some of the
innovations of the Clean Air Act made their way into the legislation as a result
of efforts or points made by the Nixon or House, in large part what made the
Clean Air Act so different from its antecedents came into the bill during the
Subcommittee’s deliberations—setting air quality and emission limitations
based solely on public health criteria, a strong but balanced federal role,84
enforceable statutory deadlines and standards (what became known together as
“technology forcing”),85 and a provision for citizen suits.
Subcommittee deliberations took place in the ironically smoke-saturated,
mid-sized Public Works Committee conference room, number 4200, in the New
Senate Office building, also known as the Dirksen.86 These meetings were out
of the public eye and off record, though stenographic notes were taken—a
number of which, but not all, still survive.
Who sat around the table? Unfortunately, but typical for the time, all
Subcommittee members and staff were white men. Also, an ironic note worth
making when considering clean air legislation, every member of the
Subcommittee and staff, except one, smoked: some puffed at cigars, others
worked through packs of cigarettes as they discussed public health standards and
air quality indices.87 Windows in the conference room remained closed,88 and so
one can easily imagine the rising, trapped smoke filtering upwards past the
chandelier and meeting the wood-paneled walls and ceiling.
The Subcommittee worked near the Foreign Relations hearing and
conference rooms, a hotspot of crucial congressional action as the Vietnam War
81. H.R. 17255, 91st Cong. (1970) (introduced in the House, Apr. 27, 1970).
82. Id. (reported in the House, June 3, 1970).
83. Interview by Brien Williams with Leon Billings, former Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Env’t Subcomm., in
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 17, 2008), https://digitalcommons.bowdoin.edu/mitchelloralhistory/194/ (“[I]t was an
era in which ten or eleven men . . . sat around in a closed room and talk about what public policy ought to be,
without the influence of lobbyists and damn little influence of staff.”).
84. Kramer, supra note 8, at 48 (“The federal role in the enforcement aspect of air pollution control has
been changed dramatically by the 1970 Amendments. Federal participation in what will be called a supervisory
or approval role, is basically a new addition to the regulatory scheme. This supervisory role encompasses the
federal government’s newly appointed powers to approve, disapprove, and promulgate state regulations and
variances dealing with the air pollution abatement program.”).
85. Gerard & Lave, supra note 21, at 763.
86. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
87. Id.
88. Id.

May 2020]

THE MAKING OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

917

intensified.89 Due to the throngs of anti-Vietnam student-protesters in
Washington, the halls were crowded and would frequently ring with anti-war
chants when members of Congress were present, generally smelling not only of
tobacco from the conference rooms but also of demonstrators’ marijuana
smoke.90 Somehow, surrounded by the haze of their own smoke and tucked away
from a progressive youth movement, this demonstrably homogenous and
institutionalist collection of legislators, embodying uncontested privilege in
America, worked out the fundamental piece of U.S. Code which would make
significant progress in cleaning the air and protecting millions of Americans’
health and well-being.
Members and staff sat around the oblong conference table at the center of
the room, ranked by seniority. Acoustics were poor, so everyone present had to
speak up.91 Jennings Randolph, chair of the full Committee and ex officio
member of the Subcommittee, often occupied the head of the table and acted as
a sort of mediator, known as being “characteristically moderate.”92 In his
absence, Subcommittee Chair Ed Muskie took the head seat.93 Left of Muskie
sat Muskie’s staff director and the-first full-time staff member of the
Subcommittee, Leon Billings of Montana.94 Although just a staff member, his
influence is matched with his prominent seat at the table—he had Muskie’s ear
and generally stood between the Subcommittee and the language of the bills.95
Left of Billings sat the majority Democrats, Thomas F. Eagleton, Birch Bayh,
Joseph M. Montoya, and William Spong.96 Sitting opposite the Democrats were
minority Republicans Caleb Boggs, John Sherman Cooper, Howard Baker, Bob
Dole, and counsel Thomas Jorling.97
Although it should be acknowledged that every member of the
Subcommittee entered into the discussion and participated in the process (a point
the Subcommittee itself was wont to acknowledge),98 of those at the table,
Muskie and Eagleton from the majority, Cooper and Baker of the minority, and
staff members Billings and Jorling exerted notable influence on the Clean Air
Act. We discuss the roles of each of these in turn.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Pub.
Works, Exec. Sess. 6 (Aug. 27, 1970) [hereinafter Public Works Hearings] (offering an example of a comment
concerning the acoustics).
92. A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air &
Water Pollution, Exec. Sess. 50 (Aug. 19, 1970) [hereinafter Air & Water Pollution Hearings] (statement of
Sen. Howard Baker).
93. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
94. Id.
95. See infra Subpart II.D.
96. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
97. Id.
98. See A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Pub.
Works, Exec. Sess. 491 (Sept. 11, 1970) (statement of Sen. John Sherman Cooper).
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B. SENATOR ED MUSKIE
Senator Ed Muskie warrants first consideration. A testament to his role, the
Clean Air Act was, at times, called the “Muskie Bill” by frustrated White House
staff.99 Staffer Leon Billings later argued that the Clean Air Act was Muskie’s
“outstanding achievement.”100 In the Senate Subcommittee, Muskie offered two
discrete policy contributions to the Clean Air Act that largely justify these
sweeping characterizations—both of which grew out of lessons Muskie took
from earlier versions of the Act and that we detail in this Subpart: a focus on
public health, rather than a technical or economic feasibility, and an evolved
take on shared federalism (the product of Muskie coming to terms with, although
modifying, the momentum for national standards generated by Nixon’s thirtyseven points).
To be clear, Muskie did not always see himself as an environment-oriented
legislator.101 When first elected to the U.S. Senate, his priority was to make a
name for himself by bringing economic development to his generally rural
constituency in Maine.102 Despite being a hunter and fisherman, Muskie’s
transition to matters of environmental conservation was something of a
byproduct of political happenstance, rather than personal background or
values.103 Muskie was punished and exiled by being assigned to the Senate
Public Works Committee, a result of sparring with Southern-dominated
Democratic seniority, including Majority Leader and future-President Lyndon
B. Johnson.104
At the time, public infrastructure, mainly upkeep of federal buildings, was
front and center for the Public Works Committee.105 This committee, along with
the Government Operation’s Intergovernmental Relations’ Subcommittee and
the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs’ Housing Subcommittee, were
considered by most as “secondary” committees106—the sort of places Johnson
would send senators “with a penchant for independence and an inclination
toward liberal activism” in order to isolate them and maintain a more
conservative party core.107 To the extent that Johnson wanted to punish Muskie,
he succeeded, at least at first. Muskie’s initial reaction to his assignment to
Public Works and the Air and Water Subcommittee was one of

99. Memorandum from Dwight L. Chapin, Deputy Assistant to President Richard Nixon, to H.R.
Haldeman, Chief of Staff, White House (Dec. 28, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 1-48).
100. Billings, supra note 61.
101. See Blohmquist, supra note 20, at 1–17; Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
102. See Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
103. Id.
104. Blohmquist, supra note 20, at 10–11; PAUL CHARLES MILAZZO, UNLIKELY ENVIRONMENTALISTS:
CONGRESS AND CLEAN WATER, 1945–1972, at 69 (2006).
105. See History and Recent Membership of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. SENATE
COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/committee-history/ (last
visited Apr. 15, 2020).
106. See interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
107. MILAZZO, supra note 104.

May 2020]

THE MAKING OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

919

disappointment108: “Air? What the hell do I care about air coming from
Maine?”109 In fact, he was initially more interested in the Rivers and Harbors
Subcommittee because, in his words, “a little pork won’t do me any harm.”110
Compounding his initial disappointment, Muskie became the first
Chairman of the Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee upon its creation in
1963;111 after all, fighting pollution brought “little political payoff” at this
time.112
As Robert Blohmquist recognizes, Muskie faced serious obstacles in
passing pollution legislation of any significance; in addition to a lack of any antipollution legislation of consequence,113 he was also up against “a presidential
administration which was, at best, lukewarm in its desire to protect the
environment . . . a quiescent and ill-informed public . . . and a recalcitrant, selfserving assortment of American industrial firms resistant to the notion of more
rigorous and costly government pollution standards.”114 His ascendancy on the
environment in committee might be explained by the fact that the interests of the
Committee Chairman Jennings Randolph were found in the brick-and-mortar
aspect of the Committee, which essentially left an opportunistic and increasingly
ambitious Muskie to run things on the environment for the Democratic side.115
He quickly began work on various bills that laid the framework for later antipollution legislation, some of which has been outlined above: the Clean Air Act
of 1963, the Water Quality Act of 1965, the Air Quality Act of 1967, and even
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.116
Regardless of his initial motivation, Muskie had adopted a more ostensibly
“environmental” outlook by 1967. During the Clean Air Act legislation process,
he employed the parlance of the emerging ecological sciences, referring multiple
times to “ecological systems”117 and the effects of dirty air on “soils, water,
vegetation . . . animals, wildlife . . . [and] climate.”118 Consideration of these
non-human elements was central in Muskie’s provisions of pollutant criteria as

108. Blohmquist, supra note 20, at 10.
109. MILAZZO, supra note 104, at 70.
110. Blohmquist, supra note 20, at 11 n.38.
111. FORSWALL & HIGGINS, supra note 24.
112. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 227; LIPPMAN & HANSEN, supra note 60, at 143.
113. DAVID NEVIN, MUSKIE OF MAINE 184 (1972).
114. Blohmquist, supra note 20, at 17.
115. Russell E. Train: Oral History Interview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://archive.epa.gov/
epa/aboutepa/russell-e-train-oral-history-interview.html (last updated Sept. 8, 2016).
116. Although Senate Bill 1075, the basis for NEPA’s policy statement and the bulk of its text, was the
product of Senator Jackson’s Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, Muskie and the Public Works Committee’s
Senate Bill 7, as well as competitions between the committees, had a significant impact on the National
Environmental Policy Act that will be explored in future research. For existing literature that touches on this
topic, see Sam Kalen, Ecology Comes of Age: NEPA’s Lost Mandate, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 113 (2010).
117. Air Pollution Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the S. Comm.
on Pub. Works, Exec. Sess. 20 (July 16, 1970) [hereinafter Public Works Hearings] (statement of Sen. Edmund
Muskie).
118. Air & Water Pollution Hearings, supra note 92, at 5 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
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they existed prior to 1970, and were incorporated into the enactment as
secondary standards during conference deliberations of the 1970 Act.119
The 1970 Clean Air Act’s public health (or rather, “health of persons”)
focus is thus both an extension of patterns exhibited by earlier legislation and a
lesson learned by the lukewarm effect of Muskie’s previous clean air efforts.
While maintaining a focus on health, Muskie and his Committee now recognized
that there could no longer be equivocation concerning standards and deadlines,
nor could they seek only to employ “available” technologies.120 By 1970, it was
clear to Muskie that the job of Congress was not to make “technological
judgments” but to establish what the “public interest requires in terms of
health.”121
Previous years and legislation experience with clean air drove in a very real
distrust for industry among members of the Subcommittee.122 Its executive
session stenographs are heavily populated with Muskie’s urging that standards
consider the effects of pollution on public health alone, without regard towards
effects on industry or for industry’s evaluations of what it could or could not do:
in fact, to the extent he focused on industry, it was to express pessimism that it
would “drag its feet” and demonstrate the same lack of urgency as in previous
years,123 continuing to be “as conservative as the devil.”124 After one meeting
with CEOs from the four major American automobile manufacturers, Muskie
proclaimed, “If that’s the quality of American business leadership, I can
understand why the Japanese are beating the hell out of us.”125
No doubt affected by the opportunity to capitalize on the political fervor
and pressure from the environmental movement, Muskie saw to it that language
considering “technical feasibility” be removed from the legislation, having been
present as late as December of 1969.126 Justifying this decision before the
Senate, Muskie argued that “we learned that tests of economic and technological

119. STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE, reprinted in 1 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 194 (1974).
120. A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Pub.
Works, Exec. Sess. 274 (Sept. 10, 1970) [hereinafter Public Works Hearings] (statement of Sen. Edmund
Muskie).
121. Id. at 277–78.
122. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, first Adm’r, Envtl. Protection Agency, in Seattle, Wash. 9–10
(May 24, 2011) (“They said, ‘If you want another year beyond the one extension, you need to come back and
ask us.’ Muskie did not trust the automobile companies. He was very angry at them because they had told him
in the previous iteration of the Clean Air Act that they would voluntarily comply and that they would come back
and report to him from time to time about what they were doing. He had become convinced that they had lied
to him and that they weren’t making a good faith effort to meet the standards. That is the way the statute got
written in such stringent terms—deadlines and percentage reductions.”).
123. A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air &
Water Pollution of the S. Comm. on Pub. Works, Exec. Sess. 142 (Aug. 4, 1970) [hereinafter Air & Water
Pollution Hearings] (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
124. Public Works Hearings, supra note 120, at 277–278 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
125. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
126. S. 3229, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a) (Dec. 10, 1969), reprinted in 1 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1514 (1974).
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feasibility applied to those standards compromise the health of our people and
lead to inadequate standards.”127
According to Muskie, to make reference to economic factors directly, in
fact, would be to “dilute” the concept of the bill, which was public health
exclusively.128 “Now what may seem economically prohibitive today may with
the benefit of hindsight ten years from now look like a very cheap answer that
we should have insisted upon at that time if we had only known,” he insisted
before the Subcommittee.129 Muskie’s idea of public health was not only
oriented towards the majority of the people, but also particularly sensitive or
vulnerable groups. Although it would be a question left for the courts to
determine how many people must be protected by the standards.130
Muskie established multiple times on record that the Act was intended to
address the needs of the vulnerable minority131: “the elderly, the young, and the
sick.”132 From the beginning, he urged the Subcommittee to center measurable
physiological public health metrics as the primary standard.133 It was this
orientation of the bill’s goals that allowed it, in conjunction with contributions
offered by his Senate colleagues, to force technology to adapt to strict statutory
standards. Thus, Muskie set the stage ideologically for the technology forcing
function of the Clean Air Act by centering public health and disregarding
technological feasibility.
A second major evolution in environmental law ushered in through the Act
was the degree of federalization of regulatory authority over environmental
pollution control created by delegating large segments of power to state
governments (using their own boundaries to define jurisdiction) in determining
how to meet his heath-based standards,134 while simultaneously increasing
federal power of review and enforcement. Responsibility for a stronger federal
presence is shared between the House and Senate; section 113 of the Senate bill
did much to expand the role of the EPA, and section 110(a)(3) took its final form
in the conference committee, largely the product of the House conferees.135
Muskie’s stance on the issue of the role of federal versus state powers is mixed
127. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM. (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM. ON
PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 125 (1974).
128. A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Pub.
Works, Exec. Sess. 217–18 (Sept. 1, 1970) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
129. Public Works Hearings, supra note 91, at 80 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
130. Air & Water Pollution Hearings, supra note 92, at 8–9 (statement of Howard Baker).
131. A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before S. Comm. on Pub. Works,
Exec. Sess. 126–27 (Aug. 31, 1970) [hereinafter Public Works Hearings] (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
132. Air & Water Pollution Hearings, supra note 92, at 9 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie); see also
Public Works Hearings, supra note 131, at 126–127 (quoting Edmund Muskie about his intent for the Act to
“have in mind groups that are especially sensitive”).
133. See Public Works Hearings, supra note 75, at 15 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
134. This being in-line with Muskie’s “states-first” environmental protection paradigm, as recognized by
Kalen, supra note 116, at 128; see also 115 CONG. REC. 29052 (1969) (“[O]nly those measures which were
designed to enhance air and water quality would be acceptable and that local and State government have the
prime responsibility to implement those measures.”).
135. Kramer, supra note 8, at 66.
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and, we argue, contributed to a more balanced outcome, perhaps ironically
moderating the federalizing pushes of the Administration and House.
Muskie himself was initially ideologically opposed to this transition of
authority towards the federal government. Again, national standards, unlike the
lion’s share of what would become the Clean Air Act, actually find their origin
in the Nixon Administration and more conservative House committees.136
Although his original position going into 1970 was to carry over the regional
standards approach of his earlier legislation, Muskie recognized that the logic of
a health-based standard required a nationally uniform standard in order to be
maximally enforceable by a federal agency—after all, to set higher standards in
some regions might give the impression of prioritizing the health of those people
at the expense of others.137
Muskie’s earlier concern was based on a fear that that the House and
Administration version’s national ambient air quality standards provision would
trend the other way and result in some compromise in terms of standard setting
(e.g. setting national standards as permissive as the most conservative state
would permit), and thus create a standard too low to protect the health of
vulnerable persons.138 Cooper, always the statesman, even had to confront
Muskie on the issue, asking, “[w]ell, you rejected everything else Nixon wants,
how about nationalizing air quality standards?”139 In fact, two years prior, during
a House-Senate Colloquium on a national environmental policy, Muskie
demonstrated his aversion to national standards when he stated that that “there
must be a great diversity in whatever [standards] we get at,” and, most strikingly,
that the Congress “ought to avoid the straitjacket of Federal standards.”140
Muskie eventually conceded, however, possibly compelled by political
necessity or out of competition with Nixon, that merely stimulating greater local
planning and standard-setting was insufficient,141 and that only uniform
standards could create the requisite sense of urgency and eliminate the risk of

136. See supra Part I; see also Kramer, supra note 8, at 62 (discussing the more “‘conservative’ tenor” of
the House).
137. STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN T. MIDDLETON, COMM’R, NAT’L AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., HEW,
AND IRWIN L. AUERBACH, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, NAT’L AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
ADMIN., HEW, reprinted in 2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1211 (1974) (Statement of Mr. Guard); A Bill to Amend the Clean Air Act and for Other
Purposes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the S. Comm. on Pub. Works, Exec. Sess.
52 (July 29, 1970) [hereinafter Public Works Hearings] (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
138. See Public Works Hearings, supra note 117, at 18 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
139. Interview by Don Nicoll with Leon Billings, former Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Env’t Subcomm., in
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 16, 2002).
140. Joint House-Senate Colloquium, supra note 36, at 81, 44 (emphasis added); Arlen J. Large, New Car
Deadline Highlights Pollution Bill, but Other Parts Could Have Broad Impact, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1970, at
2.
141. Introduction of National Air Quality Standards Act of 1970, S. 3546, 91st Cong. (1970), reprinted in
2 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 1470–1474
(1974).
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appearing equivocal or arbitrary on the issue of public health.142 Thus, Muskie
needed to step aside in order to federalize regulation, initially acting as a sort of
barrier.
However, once he accepted the thinking of federalizing power, he further
worked to strengthen the role of the federal government and the nation-wide
consistency of enforcement, demanding that federal or “national muscle” be
exerted in non-attaining areas below the established national standard, a move
prescient of the still-forthcoming Environmental Protection Agency.143 In fact,
Muskie was never ignorant of the Act’s potential to alter the landscape of
American federalism; introducing the bill in Subcommittee, he acknowledged
that it represented “a major extension of federal involvement in air pollution
control and will require an expanded federal presence.”144
“We learned from experience with implementation of the law that States
and local cities need greater incentives and assistance to protect the health and
welfare of all people,”145 Muskie told the Senate as he presented his bill. A race
to the bottom phenomenon prevented the states from shouldering pollution
control by themselves.146 Because of inadequate enforcement, he determined,
“[t]he Federal presence and backup authority had to be increased.”147 His
inclusion of land use and transportation control regulatory elements in
conference committee also created a new field of EPA control over state plans
and widened the agency’s toehold in the matter of the states.148
Balancing national standards with state-driven implementation would
allow uniform protection of public health standards by setting a “line”149 that
could not be crossed anywhere, even when economic growth would be halted,150
and preventing some regions from slacking in order to draw economic growth,
142. Air Pollution Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the S. Comm.
on Pub. Works, Exec. Sess. 14 (July 23, 1970) [hereinafter Public Works Hearings] (statement of Sen. Edmund
Muskie).
143. Air Pollution Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the S. Comm.
on Pub. Works, Exec. Sess. 28 (May 20, 1970) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
144. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466 and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of
the S. Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1 (1970).
145. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM., 2 (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM.
ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 124 (1974).
146. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122, at 1–2 (“Among which was the basic problem
was that the states were primary regulatory entities in the country, and they were competing so hard for the
location of industry within their borders that they weren’t very good regulators. . . . As you went south, it got
worse. I think that is because industrialization came along later in the south than it did in the north. As you went
north in the country where there is more concern about natural systems and the environment in general, the
regulatory system got a little tougher, but only a little. I mean I can remember George Wallace, when he was
governor of Alabama, advertising in the Indiana newspapers, ‘[b]ring your industry down here. It is okay with
us if you pour some stuff in the river. We want jobs.’”).
147. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM., at 3 (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM.
ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 124 (1974).
148. John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1199–1205
(1995).
149. Public Works Hearings, supra note 137, at 52 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
150. See id. at 49 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
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while still preserving some power in the states.151 Operationally, Muskie and his
colleagues settled on the idea of state implementation plans, the largest moving
part of the Act and a critical evolution over the “regulatory zones” of the 1967
Air Quality Act.152 By giving a mandate to the states to regulate sources while
shifting some pressure from the states to the federal government, Congress’ new
framework allowed the legislation to justify more stringent standards while
providing the states with some discretion about how to meet federal standards.
In the event that states failed to meet set federal standards, the Act would create
a non-discretionary duty for the federal government to step in and make the call
instead, absolving the state of assuming political fallout.
Thus, although the Act broadened federal authority, Muskie was careful to
design it so as not to create an unwieldy federal bureaucracy. In Senate debates,
for example, Muskie was sure to emphasize the latent primacy of states and
municipalities in enforcement.153 Instead, the Act sought to give to states the
responsibility and authority to act at first, with federal agency action reserved as
a back-up in the case of state failure.154 Muskie moderated the expansion of

151. David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism When Numbers Matter More than Size, 32 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 256 (2014) (“The standards for new motor vehicles, which required roughly a 90 percent
reduction in emissions by 1975, were the most hotly contested provisions.”); Lazarus, supra note 38, at 324–35
(describing the Clean Air Act’s numerous deadlines as ambitious if not unrealistic); see also Adelman, supra,
at 293 (“The NAAQS program and its system of cooperative federalism are considered to be the cornerstone of
the CAA and integral to its many successes.”); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1106 (2009) (“The basic framework for controlling air pollution since the enactment of
the modern CAA in 1970 is one of cooperative federalism.”); Dwyer, supra note 148, at 1184; Richard J.
Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States Environmental Law: Reflections on
Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 77–78 (2001); Jeffrey
G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Environmental Enforcement
Actions by EPA and Citizens, Part Two: Statutory Preclusions on EPA Enforcement, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 10 (2005) (calling the Clean Air Act’s “complicated ‘cooperative federalism’” the “bedrock of its
environmental programs”); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 31, 64 (2011) (calling the
Clean Air Act a “cooperative federalism program” and explaining that in the Clean Air Act “Congress allocates
rulemaking authority to a federal agency but invites the states to implement and enforce those rules”). How much
cooperation is part of the Clean Air Act’s cooperative federalism scheme though is a matter of debate. See Train
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975) (describing the Clean Air Act’s cooperative federalism as
“taking a stick to the States”); Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 754–55 (2006) (arguing cooperative
federalism serves as a “constraint on the capacity of either level of government to take effective steps to protect
the environment”).
152. See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans—ThirtySeven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2004).
153. 116 CONG. REC. 42,385 (1970). Muskie had maintained this position of relative state primacy since
1963. See Edmund S. Muskie, The Role of the Federal Government in Air Pollution Control, 10 ARIZ. L. REV.
17, 18 (1968) (“The philosophy of the Clean Air Act of 1963 was to encourage state, regional and local programs
to control and abate pollution, while spelling out the authority of the national government to step into interstate
situations with effective enforcement authority.”).
154. Air & Water Pollution Hearings, supra note 92, at 26–27 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie); Clean
Air Act § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2018).
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federal authority and saw to a balanced vision of Clean Air Act federalism.155
The coming EPA was intended by the Clean Air Act to assume the role of the
“gorilla in the closet,” as the first Administrator of the EPA, William
Ruckelshaus, characterized it, who would oversee, but not commandeer, the
operations of the states.156
It is worth noting that Muskie led the Subcommittee by working to build
consensus, rather than by commanding or asserting himself unnecessarily.
Howard Baker, Muskie’s Republican counterpart on the Subcommittee, called
him “lead ass” for his ability to sit and listen to questions and comments about
potential legislation for hours until he was totally satisfied that the needs of the
Subcommittee were taken into account, sometimes leaving the office at 10:00 at
night with a stack of memos and returning at 5:00 in the morning with responses
ready.157 In the conference committee, however, Muskie was able to shift from
patterns of compromise and instead draw the line in order to protect the integrity
of the Senate bill with minimal unnecessary substantive concessions.158
As a final note on the importance of Senator Muskie in the development of
the Act, it must be acknowledged that his political stature as a threat to Nixon
placed significant pressure on the President to adopt the environment as an issue
in general. After Ted Kennedy’s Chappaquiddick incident ruined his chances at
the Presidency, Muskie became the Democratic frontrunner to challenge Nixon
in 1972.159 Polls showed Muskie as a true threat to defeat the Republican
President.160 Despite some criticism from radicals like Ralph Nader,161 Muskie
had broad appeal to Democrats due to his strength on Civil Rights and the
environment. While Muskie’s campaign for the Presidency would eventually be
derailed by a forged letter accusing him of racism towards French-Canadians,162
his status as the lead challenger to Nixon gave strength to the environmental
movement and motivated Republicans to back environmental initiatives.163

155. See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 101(a)(3), 81 Stat. 485; Air Quality Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(b), 81 Stat. 491 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3 (1970); see also 113 CONG. REC.
19174–75 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Boggs); 113 CONG. REC. 19172 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
The role of the federal government in Muskie’s SIP framework may have been less clear, but it was also less
commanding outright than the Administration bill. Kramer, supra note 8, at 60.
156. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122 (“We would say to industries, you better deal
with them or you will have to worry about the EPA coming in here and flailing around and getting you in trouble.
In that sense, the States used us as a bogeyman or “gorilla in the closet” that would really harm the polluters
if they did not come into compliance.”).
157. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
158. See infra Subpart III.A.
159. Robert Wayne Norton, The Rhetorical Situation Is the Message: Muskie’s Election Eve Television
Broadcast, 22 CENT. STS. SPEECH J. 171, 175 (1971).
160. Nixon and Muskie Nearly Even at 43% and 42% in Gallup Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1972, at L69.
161. Brigham Daniels, Environmental Regulatory Nukes, 6 UT. L. REV. 1505, 1517–18 (2013).
162. James N. Naughtin, Muskie Denies an Ethnic Slur, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 1972),
https://www.nytimes.com/1972/02/27/archives/muskie-denies-an-ethnic-slur.html.
163. See Daniels, supra note 161, at 1517–18.
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C. SENATORS BAKER AND EAGLETON
Although these contributions and the ideological framing provided by
Senator Muskie established a base for the Clean Air Act, particular details of the
bill were the result of participation in the legislation process by other members
of the Subcommittee, particularly Senator Baker from the Republican Minority
and Senator Eagleton from the Democratic Majority, as mentioned above. An
issue that would come to follow strict party lines in later decades, the Clean Air
Act surprisingly received robust support from Subcommittee members of both
parties at its genesis. If Senator Muskie, the poster boy of the environmental
movement, was an “unlikely environmentalist,”164 then the rest of the
Committee’s members were even less likely environmentalists. Even if they
were skilled legislators with the best of intentions, there was nothing in the past
of these senators that made them likely candidates to do what they did in
advancing policies to protect the environment.
What makes their contributions all the more worth understanding is that
despite these Senators’ odd fit for the job, they made some of the most
innovative contributions to the Act, which oftentimes are wrongly credited to
Senator Muskie alone. Indeed, between Senators Howard Baker and Thomas
Eagleton, crucial structures of technology forcing were advanced within the
Subcommittee and implemented into the Clean Air Act, in large part giving the
Clean Air Act teeth. The ingredients they offered, outlined below, together
minimized potentially obstructive Administrative deference and forced the
hands of both the EPA and the courts for decades to come.165
Next to Senator Muskie, Senator Baker (R-Tennessee) is frequently
credited from those involved for playing what might be seen as the most
important role of any senator on the Committee in the Act’s legislative process.
Deep into one late executive session, for example, Senator Eagleton commented
that Baker persevered on the bill “second to none, or maybe second to
Muskie.”166 Baker was recalled as Muskie’s “first mate and later his co-captain”
on the environment,167 and was known as a great conciliator for his ability to
bring together proponents of vastly different ideologies and reach
compromise.168 After his death, a Democratic colleague memorialized Baker,
saying that “Howard Baker’s distinguished career as senator and statesman is a
product of his unique capacity to win the confidence and trust of even those with
whom he fundamentally disagreed.”169 This unique capacity became especially
important while Baker worked on environmental policy on the Committee.
164. See generally MILAZZO, supra note 104.
165. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122.
166. Public Works Hearings, supra note 120, at 325 (statement of Sen. Thomas Eagleton).
167. BAKER JR., supra note 59, at 12.
168. See id. at 4.
169. Ron Elving, Howard Baker’s Legacy: Political, but Not Partisan, NPR (June 26, 2014, 5:33 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2014/06/26/325920335/howard-bakers-legacy-political-but-not-
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Despite any complaints of industry to the contrary, Baker, a “technological
cornucopian,”170 strongly believed in American industry’s capacity to adapt and
overcome technological challenges.171 The term “technology forcing” was first
coined by the courts,172 partially in reference to Senator Eagleton’s words in
Subcommittee executive session,173 to refer to the Clean Air Act’s provision “to
require stationary sources of air pollution to comply with regulatory standards
or shut down, even if the state’s emission control requirements are economically
or technically impossible to achieve,” thus seeking to “induce technical
innovation.”174
Technology forcing is both a complement to and a consequence of
commitment to Muskie’s public health focus. “The health of people is more
important,” the Senate report reads, “than the question of whether the early
achievement of ambient air quality standards protective of health is technically
feasible. . . . Therefore, the Committee determined that existing sources of
pollutants either should meet the standard of the law or be closed down.”175
In committee, Baker frequently and aggressively pushed the issue of using
public policy to force technological evolution. On one occasion in executive
session, for example, Billings expressed what seemed to be an ostensible display
of doubt regarding the practicality of the forcing concept being pursued by the
Committee, to which Baker responded “Leon, you are a gentle advocate, and
what you are trying to do is to lead into saying that this isn’t practical, but it
is.”176
The auto industry saw the possibility of avoiding heavy investment into
cleaner cars on the basis of economic and technological infeasibility, and
discussions with industry representatives became frustrating for members of the
Subcommittee;177 thus, as conflict between Committee members and industry
representatives grew more common, the distaste held by the Senators towards
the auto industry grew. One example of this comes from a particularly intense
partisan. Baker’s bipartisan ethics carried translated into the actions of the other members of the Committee:
“Prejudices and priorities, interests and constituencies were laid on the table, often bluntly, frequently with
humor. And in our committee, we always made decisions by consensus.” Howard Baker, Ambassador to Japan,
Cleaning America’s Air—Progress and Challenges (Mar. 9, 2005), http://www.muskiefoundation.org/
baker.030905.html.
170. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
171. Baker, supra note 169.
172. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 258 (1976). The term “technology-forcing” first appeared in
cases and commentaries in 1975; see, e.g., Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 91 (1975); John Bonine,
The Evolution of “Technology-Forcing” in the Clean Air Act, Env’t Rep. (BNA), Monograph No. 21, 1975.
173. Public Works Hearings, supra note 142, at 11–12 (statement of Sen. Thomas Eagleton).
174. Forcing Technology: The Clean Air Act Experience, 88 Yale L.J. 1713, 1713–14 (1979).
175. 1 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at
402–03 (1974), quoted in MELNICK, supra note 16, at 213 (alteration in original).
176. Air Pollution Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the S. Comm.
on Pub. Works, Exec. Sess. 30 (July 20, 1970) (statement of Sen. Howard Baker).
177. Leon Billings, former Staff Dir., U.S. Senate Env’t Subcomm., & Thomas Jorling, former Minority
Counsel, U.S. Senate Comm. On Pub. Works, Address at Columbia Law School (Sept. 3, 2014),
https://vimeo.com/122375774.

928

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:901

meeting where industry representatives were attempting to convince a skeptical
Committee that the technology standard pushed by the Subcommittee was not
feasible for the industry to meet. Part way through the meeting, minority counsel
Tom Jorling left the meeting room to use the restroom.178
On this occasion, he was followed by one of the technical people from
General Motors. While standing next to each other at the urinal, the man
confided to Jorling: “We can build whatever you tell us to build. If you tell us to
build a clean car, we will build a clean car.”179 There were other instances where
manila envelopes were sent anonymously to the Subcommittee with internal
documents that undercut positions industry representatives had made to the
Committee.180 Interactions like these did not do any favors for the auto
companies, and Baker was able to win over the Committee members, doubling
down on Muskie’s general skepticism, that industry could comply with the
standards included in the bill. History would vindicate the technology forcing
approach. As a result of the law, new emission control technologies were
induced for various polluting industries, including copper smelting and electric
power production.181
Another important contribution of Senator Baker to the Act was his
unwavering efforts to push along the work of the Committee, which translated
to his unwavering support of the enactment’s passage. It is not hard to imagine
that Senator Baker’s support of the bill (as the Committee’s minority ranking
member) gave many other Republicans comfort—he was no Senator Muskie
who aspired to unseat a GOP President. Baker’s support, certainly along with
the President’s earlier call for clean air legislation, gave ample political cover
for Republicans in Congress who wanted to support the Clean Air Act.
Another Senator, Thomas Eagleton, also bore significant influence on the
Act and helped ideate policy mechanisms to translate the intentions of the
Subcommittee into meaningful law. More than any other Subcommittee
member, Eagleton was responsible for the many fixed statutory deadlines found
in the Clean Air Act. Like his colleagues, Eagleton may have been aware of
broad public cynicism concerning Congress.182 His pitch when coming to the
Committee, as later characterized and most likely caricaturized by staff member
Leon Billings, demonstrates these feelings: “You know, we tell the public all
this bullshit about how we are going to do something and then we never do it
because we don’t set deadlines. If I am going to participate in the process, we
are going to set deadlines on this law.”183

178. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See GERARD & LAVE, supra note 21; Forcing Technology, supra note 174, at 1719–21; Schoenbrod,
supra note 12, at 744–45.
182. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
183. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
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The Clean Air Act operates by deadlines to force action at various levels
of government;184 a thirty-day limit on EPA to publish standards, nine months
granted to the states to submit implementation plans after comment review,185
seven months for emissions standards promulgation,186 and so on.187 Most
importantly, an insistence for deadlines-forcing resulted in Title II’s statutory
1975 deadline for a ninety percent reduction in hydrocarbons and carbon
monoxide reduction and later became the bill’s key source of controversy,188 a
major hang-up for both the Nixon Administration and the House conferees.189
The Administration bill had initially set the goal of 1980, but Eagleton, Muskie,
and the Committee sought an even more ambitious goal of achieving the
pollution reduction goals five years earlier. Eagleton was the “initiator” of the
conversation of statutory deadlines for ambient air quality standards and pushed
the 1975 deadline in particular.190
Tasked with enforcing this stringent deadline, Russell Train, as the second
Administrator of the EPA, called the decision “arbitrary.”191 And, admittedly,
this criticism is not without merit. However, as Eagleton insisted, arbitrary
deadlines still had the power to force action, and a firm deadline was better than
a lax one to this end. Eagleton’s drive to set a deadline that would create
significant pressure on industry was not necessarily borne out of a belief that
they would definitely achieve it, but rather out of a broader awareness that
without deadlines, action would be delayed indefinitely. As he stated in
executive session:
I just felt that unless you put an identifiable goal and try to force, as it were,
use the word “force,” people towards that goal. If it is open-ended, God
knows whenever we will get to the goal. . . . I am not saying this all won’t be
amended two or three or four years from now. If we don’t have a date in it,
in my judgment somewhere along the line it will go on into the 90’s and the
year 2000.192

Eagleton’s insistence for deadlines also folded in well with Muskie’s and
Baker’s broader goals, who stated that a deadline by statute best leverages the
184. For example, see Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1990) (“When Congress has explicitly
set an absolute deadline, congressional intent is clear. . . . The EPA cannot extract leeway from a statute that
Congress explicitly intended to be strict.”); see also infra Part IV (considering the Act as it exists today as the
product of all branches of government).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
186. Id. § 1857c-6(b)(1)(B).
187. See Kramer, supra note 8, at 67–68.
188. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), § 202, 84 Stat. 1690 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2018)) (“The regulations under subsection (a) applicable to emissions of carbon monoxide
and hydrocarbons from light duty vehicles and engines manufactured during or after model year 1975 shall
contain standards which require a reduction of at least 90 per centum from emissions of carbon monoxide and
hydrocarbons allowable under the standards under this section applicable to light duty vehicles and engines
manufactured in model year 1970.”).
189. See infra Subpart III.A.
190. Public Works Hearings, supra note 142, at 1 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
191. TRAIN, supra note 1, at 167.
192. Public Works Hearings, supra note 142, at 11–12 (statement of Sen. Thomas Eagleton).
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ethos of Congress to communicate the “urgency of the problem, the importance
of public health. . . . [T]his is the goal[;] Congress says it is.”193 Or, as Baker
articulated, deadlines by statute force action and shield the decision from future
political pressure: “[W]e have got to have some sort of future arbitrary date if
we are going to accomplish anything and . . . we have got to relieve the Secretary
of HEW” of lobbying “to have the regulations changed or a date extended, or an
exception granted, and the like.”194 This recognition that such an “arbitrary date”
must be soon enough so as to spur innovation was balanced against the
recognition that a date set too soon carried the risk of discrediting the law.195
Other innovations of the Senate bill also set it apart from the House version,
though the sources of these changes are harder to square with the Congressional
Record. Criminal penalties and citizen suits, while not included in the House
bill,196 were integral parts of the Senate version, giving teeth to other provisions
and providing incentives for the government to comply with federal mandates
and polluters to comply with regulations. While the legislative record isn’t
entirely conclusive on the inclusion of these ideas into the bill and the
circumstances in which they were incorporated, first-hand accounts from
Billings and Jorling give some hints as to factors that encouraged their adoption.
The idea of citizen suits apparently originated not only outside the
Committee, but also outside the Senate altogether.197 At the time, Professor
Joseph Sax (then at the University of Michigan Law School) was writing articles
that pushed federal courts to provide the opportunity for citizens to litigate
environmental issues, a concept tested at a smaller scale in the form of the
Michigan Environmental Protection Act.198 According to Jorling and Billings,
Sax had introduced Michigan Senator Phil Hart to these ideas with hopes of them
being included in some federal environmental legislation.199 Senator Hart also
happened to be Ed Muskie’s closest personal friend in the Senate, giving him
Muskie’s ear and allowing him to ask Muskie to incorporate Sax’s ideas into the
1970 Clean Air Act.200 Although Muskie initially “hated”201 the idea, according
to Billings, he insisted that it be considered by the Subcommittee as a favor to
his friend Senator Hart.202 The staunchest supporters of the idea of citizen suits
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Public Works Hearings, supra note 120, at 349.
Public Works Hearings, supra note 142, at 12 (statement of Sen. Howard Baker).
Id. at 14–16.
STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE, supra note 119.
Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION (1970); see also
JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 4, 10
(1987); Mark Van Putten, Making Ideas Matter: Remembering Joe Sax, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 167,
170 (2014) (crediting Sax with inventing the idea for citizen suits); Joseph L. Sax & Joseph F. DiMento,
Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years’ Experience Under The Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 62 (1974) (compiling states that follow Sax’s model enactment, used first in Michigan).
199. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37; interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
200. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 45.
201. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
202. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 45.
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on the Subcommittee, on the other hand, seem to have been Senators Eagleton
and Baker.203
The arrival of the idea of citizen suits came at an opportune time as the
members considered what to do when “the government doesn’t act on a
mandatory duty.”204 Thus, Hart’s friendship with Muskie and the need for a
check on the government led to the adoption of citizen suits as the bill’s vehicle
for enforcement. This sat well with Baker and Eagleton, who had been
advocating for a remedy to governmental failure to comply with mandates that
went beyond oversight.205
Finally, the legislative record gives little indication of who introduced
criminal penalties to the Senate bill, but it does show that it was a point of debate
and discussion.206 While the final determination that entered the enactment set
the maximum penalty for five years’ imprisonment,207 the evolution of the
discussion is not altogether clear. We do find at least initial hesitation on the part
of Senator Cooper, who held the position that imprisonment was never a power
to be taken lightly, representing a conservative ideology that was rooted in his
concern over power of the state.208 Despite the reservations of Cooper, the
penalties made it into the bill, giving the necessary teeth to the Clean Air Act to
demand that it be taken seriously and marked a serious innovation by the
Subcommittee.
D. STAFF CONTRIBUTIONS OF LEON BILLINGS AND THOMAS JORLING
The roles that Leon Billings and Tom Jorling played on the Committee
were also significant.209 They were not only the work engines that translated the
203. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
204. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
205. Id.
206. Public Works Hearings, supra note 137, at 36–41 (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
207. Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (2018).
208. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
209. The prominence of Billings and Jorling, though generally recognized by those involved, is often
neglected in the literature, though there are a few notable exceptions to this characterization. See FLIPPEN, supra
note 16, at 9, 113, 151, 191; MILAZZO, supra note 104, at 92–97, 126–133, 195–96, 241, 243; TRAIN, supra note
2 at 179 (recalling Leon Billings by name in conjunction with Muskie and the “close eye” they kept on “EPA
and its implementation of the laws,” and that they were in frequent touch). References to Leon Billings may be
the defining characteristic that distinguishes a certain tier of histories of this period in environmental law of the
first and second sort. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302
(2014) (No. 12-1146), cited in Brief of Leon G. Billings and Thomas C. Jorling as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 3, West Virginia v. EPA, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (2016) (No. 15-1363)
(“Justice Breyer has cited Mr. Billings’ leadership in drafting the 1970 Amendments as a valuable resource in
the interpretation of the Act as it applies to stationary sources and greenhouse gas emissions.”); Robert F.
Blohmquist, In Search of Themis: Toward the Meaning of the Ideal Legislator-Senator Edmund S. Muskie and
the Early Development of Modern American Environmental Law, 1965–1968, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 539, 606–07 (2004) (noting Billings’s influence to the environmental debate); William H. Rodgers,
Jr., The Most Creative Moments in the History of Environmental Law: The Who’s, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 6
(1999) (“Leon Billings and Tom Jorling, young staffers for Senator Edmund Muskie, borrowed the central
premise of the Clean Water Act—no discharge—from the Refuse Act of 1899.”); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The
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Subcommittee’s deliberations into concise statutory language and organized the
agenda, they were also active participants at critical decision points, at times
even being advocates for policy positions, generally granted considerable
deference by full members of Subcommittee.210 In other words, their
contributions affected both the atmosphere of deliberation and the language of
the Act itself. Other staff members, such as Minority Chief of Staff Richard B.
Royce and Chief Counsel M. Barry Meyer, participated actively in discussions
and should not be overlooked altogether, but Billings and Jorling stand out for
their prominent role in the Subcommittee’s work on the Clean Air Act and
continued engagement in overseeing the Act in the coming years,211 justifying
the particular attention we pay to them in this Subpart.
Jorling and Billings had come to know each other during the 1968 election
cycle, even before they began work together on the Public Works Committee.212
Their ability to work well together was derived from their respective
backgrounds; Billings believed strongly in the environmental issue,213 and
Jorling had a rare postgraduate education in ecology, then a budding scientific
discipline.214 Billings was, in his own words, “the political guy who didn’t know
jack shit about the environment,”215 while Jorling was “the environmentalist
who had gone to law school and had some fixed ideas on what was wrong with
the public policy.”216
Of the two staff members, perhaps due to his bombastic personality,
Billings’ voice was heard frequently on the Committee. Billings’ stature was
even noted by the popular press media of the day, which characterized him
facetiously as “Senator Billings,”217 and he similarly claimed to have garnered a
Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins and Morphology, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009,
1014 (1994) (noting the “staff heroics” of Billings and Jorling).
210. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37; interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 45.
211. In later years, the two would stand out as the primary de facto historians of the Committee during this
crucial period of merging environmental law through visiting lectures at universities, interviews, and other
speaking engagements. Unfortunately, Billings was never able to publish a complete volume of his reflections.
212. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37; interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 45.
213. Memorandum from Leon Billings to File (undated) (on file with authors as Muskie 1-13, at 2) (“We
are creating ecological Armageddon. We are tampering in unknown ways with elements of the biosphere, the
interconnection of which we either don’t know or don’t understand.”); see also Emily Yehle, Recalling the Long,
Hard Slog to a “Historic Piece of Legislation,” E&E NEWS (Jan. 20, 2014) (“This may sound phony: I didn’t
do this to get my name attached to something. I did it for the outcome,” Billings says today from his home in
Bethany Beach, Del. “It has always been more important to me. I don’t mind the recognition—I’m not being
humble. In the context of what I had opportunity to accomplish, I’m very comfortable taking the credit.”).
214. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 45.
215. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
216. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37. The two grew closer as they commuted to work together in
Billings’ black F-150 taking detours to avoid riots in the protest-torn Washington. These rides served a unifying
purpose, allowing for Jorling and Billings to discuss the happenings of each day and maintaining strong
communication, transparency, and trust between the majority and minority factions of the Committee. Id.
217. Arthur J. Magida, Clean Air Act Deliberations—the Changing of the Guard, NATIONAL JOURNAL ENVIRONMENT REPORT 340-41 (1976) (on file with authors as Muskie 1-10) (see, e.g., David Johnson, National
Governors’ Conference: “The problem was Billings. He was extremely frustrating. In his autocratic fashion, he
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reputation in Detroit among the auto making industry.218 Despite his modesty in
claiming “damn little influence” on the Subcommittee,219 Leon Billings in
reality held a prominent place in the air legislation process and in the Committee
generally,220 supporting tough provisions in Committee and defending the bill
against detractors,221 like an up-and-coming Ralph Nader.222 President Cole of
General Motors told Billings over dinner that he believed he could “spit at the
real cause of the auto industry’s problem on clean air in Washington,” implying
that Billings was the “real” driver of the Clean Air Act.223 Cole continued by
“tirad[ing] against the staff for distorting the information” and accused Billings
of “deliberately misinforming the members,” further claiming that “not a single
member of the Committee had ever read the bill nor did they understand it,
indicating that [Billings] was the only person who knew the legislation at all.”224
Someone even etched into the plaster wall of a telephone booth across the hall
of the Committee’s offices the ominous confession “Leon Billings is God.”225
Jorling played the important role of advising the Republican Senators on
legal and ecological matters as minority counsel, and it may be difficult to
overstate the degree of importance that his cross-disciplinary background had in
fulfilling his responsibilities on the Committee.226 Jorling helped the
Subcommittee run smoothly and efficiently by providing important context and
information regarding both the science and language of the enactment during
showed no genuine interest in the needs of the states. I don’t know whether Muskie was aware of his
indifference”; Larry S. Snowhite: “He’s [Billing’s] probably one of the most knowledgeable staff persons on the
Hill. You can’t bull him. But he has more rigid views than the House staff.”).
218. Memorandum from Leon Billings to File 2 (on file with authors as Muskie 1-24).
219. Billings, supra note 61, at 63; Interview by Brien Williams with Leon Billings, supra note 83, at 23.
220. See Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, to John D. Ehrlichman (June 24, 1971) (on file with authors
as Nixon 2-66) (blaming Billings for discarding the Administration Clean Water bill and supplanting it with a
tougher and more expensive bill; Whitaker calls the new Senate print the “Billings bill.”); see also interview
with Russell Train (on file with authors as Transcribed Interviews 4-10) (“Leon didn’t let many days go by
without calling and telling you what you did wrong.”); Memorandum from Leon Billings 2–3 (on file with
authors as Muskie 1-24) (In 1970, when Ralph Nader attacked Muskie and his work on the 1967 Air Quality
Act, it was Billings who coordinated and managed the counterattack even through Conference. In addition to
“shoving it up Nader’s ass,” Billings also saw himself as the “bête noire” of the auto industry, subject to deep
“personal animosity” from the executives of major American automakers. He engaged in verbal spats with the
President of Ford Motors, Ed Cole, on one trip to Detroit, working to set the tone of the Committee’s
invulnerability to industry influence); Letter from Edmund Muskie, United States Senator, to Jimmy Carter,
President-elect (Dec. 3, 1976) (on file with authors as Muskie 1-9) (Muskie recommends Billings for the position
of EPA Administrator, telling the President that Billings “is known, and I think respected, by industry,
environmentalists, state and local government officials, and many members of Congress. He is candid,
aggressive, and intelligent. I doubt there is any single individual who has broader knowledge of environmental
law, environmental issues and environmental politics.”).
221. See Air & Water Pollution Hearings, supra note 123, at 145 (showing that Senator Muskie pushed for
quicker implementation of the clean internal combustion engine).
222. See generally JOHN C. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR: THE RALPH NADER STUDY REPORT ON AIR
POLLUTION (1970).
223. Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 220, at 3.
224. Id.
225. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
226. Leon Billings & Thomas Jorling, supra note 177.
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deliberations in Subcommittee and negotiations between Senate and House
conferees.227 While this work often required long hours of tedious work poring
over details, it allowed for the Senators to sort through ideas and deliberate
effectively. Having come to the Committee with hesitations about working for
Republicans, with whom he disagreed on some issues,228 Jorling embraced the
opportunity to achieve his bold environmental ambitions while serving the
members of the Committee.
Most specifically, Billings’ and Jorling’s positions put them “closest to
language,”229 standing between the Senators and the bill’s text, interpreting
proposed language and evaluating its probable impact. They were also the pointmen in the effort to take “the maze out” of the text by insisting on clear,
straightforward, and mandatory language.230 This non-discretionary nature,
dominating much of the Clean Air Act, would later become crucial in forcing
the hand of the EPA and the courts to enforce the Act consistently and in line
with congressional intentions.231 As Jorling remembers, the two were committed
to the viewpoint that “discretion always meant either delay or nonperformance.”232 Mandatory language protected the at-times-willing EPA from
political backlash in making tough regulatory decisions and twisted the arm of
other-times-unwilling EPA programs just the same.233
Ultimately, in the spirit of Muskie’s aim for “national muscle,” Billings
insisted that “given the choice from being controversial or being weak, [the
agencies] always chose weakness” and needed to be compelled rather than
guided.234 In particular, Billings petitioned the Committee to exclude from the
Clean Air Act the term “significantly” and other adverbs “that tended to make it
possible to argue what Congress really meant.”235 Uses of “may” were swapped
by staff out for “shall” and, with little controversy or discussion, Billings and
Jorling shaved off the “fuzz language” of previous bills that severely limited
their meaning and worked to narrow potentially significant language like
“minute” and “irreversible harm.”236 Jorling believes that this effort paid off, and
227. Air Pollution Amend: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the S. Comm. on
Pub. Works, 91st Cong., Exec. Sess. 27–31 (July 28, 1970) [hereinafter Air & Water Pollution Hearings]
(statements of Sen. Thomas Jorling); Brief of Leon G. Billings and Thomas C. Jorling as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 3, West Virginia v. EPA, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (2016) (No. 151363) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014)
(No. 12-1146)).
228. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37.
229. Air & Water Pollution Hearings, supra note 92, at 106 (statement of Sen. Howard Baker).
230. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
231. See infra Part IV.
232. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 37 (“Discretion always meant either delay or non-performance.
So, how do you address discretion? You change it to mandatory obligation, but even if it’s mandatory. We had
a lot of discussions about this with Howard Baker, who was a very good lawyer. ‘Let’s say we charge EPA you shall do this’ and they don’t do it. What’s the remedy? There is no remedy, and that led to citizen suits.”).
233. See infra Part IV.
234. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
235. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
236. See Air & Water Pollution Hearings, supra note 227, at 8–10.
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that the language of the Act was sufficiently straightforward that the courts have
generally interpreted the text in a way that he sees as true to the Committee’s
intent.237
III. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE AND PASSAGE
The work of the Senate Committee, however, still had to survive some
scrutiny in the form of conference committee with the more Administrationsensitive and conservative House conferees before the Act was in the clear. This
Part follows the story of the challenges posed to the Senate bill both by the
conference process itself and in the process of securing President Nixon’s
signature. Although Nixon publicly called for clean air legislation and endorsed
Congress’ early working bills, the bill had evolved in the Senate Committee to
demand much more than that which the President originally sought, and
significantly more than he was comfortable with. Both stories, that of the
conference committee and the signing, demonstrate a through-line of agonism
between Nixon and Muskie which signified their larger political rivalry, perhaps
even threatening to sink the Clean Air Act altogether.
A. CLEARING CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
The Subcommittee’s bill cleared the Senate with minimal scarring from
floor debates. Like the House’s earlier bill, the bill passed out of the Senate with
overwhelming support, garnering a unanimous vote of eighty-six to zero.238
Because the bills from the House and the Senate were so different, a lot hung in
the balance as both the Senate and the House appointed members to the
conference committee, where the conferees would need to reconcile the weaker
House bill, which matched well with the Nixon Administration’s stated
preferences,239 with a much tougher Senate bill.
As discussed in this Subpart, a major hurdle for the conference committee
became clear as pressure from the White House, mediated by the House
conferees and actions of Administration officials, threatened to eliminate the
Senate bill’s strict one-year automotive emissions reduction deadline provision
and economic cost inconsideration. The Senate conferees’ effort was guided
primarily by Muskie, whose uncompromising position dominated the
conference outcome. Still recognizing the contributions of other Subcommittee
members, Billings later remembered that Muskie “challenged his colleagues in
committee, on the floor, and in conference to defend anything less than forcing
technology to achieve healthy air by a date standard. None did.”240 Leon
237. Interview with Tom Jorling, supra note 45.
238. 1 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at iii
(1974).
239. Memorandum, General Strategy—Air Pollution Conference Committee, at 1 (undated) (on file with
authors as Nixon 2-126) (“The House bill on the other hand generally follows the Administration’s
recommendations, and is therefore reasonably satisfactory.”).
240. Billings, supra note 61, at 63.
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Billings’ recollections provide much color and insight into the conference
committee process that may be otherwise absent in the available documentary
history, and his characterization of the events are considered here to craft a
narrative of the conference proceedings.
In contrast to his efforts to seemingly bend over backwards to create
consensus on the Subcommittee, Muskie’s unwillingness to compromise in the
conference made him a perennial obstacle to those who wanted to change the
legislation in such a way that he believed might weaken it. Illustrating the
Administration’s position, and demonstrating Muskie’s prominent ability to
shelter the bill from weakening, John Whitaker wrote during the conference
process that
The Muskie Senate version is much tougher with some real questions as to
whether the automobile companies can meet the standards for automobile
emissions required by the bill.

....
The Administration [can] make no attempt to soften the Senate Bill in
Conference because if we publicly oppose the bill, we will be hurt politically
by being “too soft on pollution” and in Dick Cook’s view, [it] won’t affect
the outcome anyway.241

The culmination of the Subcommittee’s work to force technology for the
public interest, the 1975 auto emissions standard in many ways became the
sticking point in the conference.242 As “[i]ndustry cried foul, . . . demanded
hearings, [and] several groups suggested that the bill would put them out of
business,”243 it became the key decision of the conference.244
Statutory standards offered stronger congressional control and minimized
the risk of administrative equivocation and weakening of the Act. With little
movement happening in conference, the legislation risked being lost altogether
should Congress adjourn without reconciling the different bills.245 In fact, some
within the White House had been working to slow the conference process with
the House conferees in order to kill the bill and try again next year.246 Just before
midterm election day, a “flurry of activity” and concessions from the House
241. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, Deputy Secretary to the President for Domestic Affairs, to Ken
Cole, Assistant to the President for Domestic Aff. (Sept. 17, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-39).
242. Staff Reporter, Nixon Expected to Sign Clean Air Act Today, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1970, at 9.
243. Memorandum from Leon Billings supra note 1, at 1 (undated) (on file with authors as Muskie 1–15).
244. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM. (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM. ON
PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 123–28 (1974) (“One issue
on which there will be repeated interpretation and misinterpretation involves the deadline for achievement of
emissions standards for passenger cars.”).
245. This was a conscious strategy of contrarians in the White House. Memorandum from Ken Cole,
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, to John Whitaker, Deputy Sec’y to the President for Domestic
Affairs (Oct. 3, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-125) (“If the Congress tackled this bill after the election,
we would have a little more freedom to maneuver. Of course, we may lose the bill entirely, but it’s such a bad
bill that it hardly seems to make any difference at this point.”). See generally Memorandum from Leon Billings,
supra note 56.
246. Memorandum from Ken Cole, supra note 245 (explaining that the Nixon Administration maneuvered
to delay the bill as long as possible).
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allowed the Senate to have their way on 1975 auto emissions, and the Title II
standards were incorporated into the law.247 The election itself was undoubtedly
a major factor in this period of rapid gaining of ground by Muskie and his Senate
cohort; any House member would be tempted by the political points in their
home districts offered by credit-taking on the motherhood issue.
Once the conferees returned, however, and political pressure was alleviated
by the release valve of a past election, the Senate conferees lost their momentum
and “[n]o one could quite recall accepting Senate language and the job began all
over again,” as Billings remembered.248 Like the more moderate House
conferees, the 1975 auto emissions standard deadline was also the major hangup of the White House, despite the urging of then-CEQ Chair and future EPA
Administrator Russell Train to accept the “extremely tough” Senate bill in order
to avoid any potential political backlash.249
Opposing Train, however, Secretary Richardson of Health, Education, and
Welfare mobilized to influence House conferees,250 attempting to cut the
stronger Senate deadline and citizen suit provisions,251 which did not exist in the
House bill,252 thus providing cover for the Administration and allowing it to set
its own priorities when it came time to enforce the bill. Some controversy was
generated by the publicly-released “Richardson letter,” which threatened to out
the White House and its attempt to curb the Clean Air Act. Richardson’s efforts
were, in reality, part of a larger scheme orchestrated by John Whitaker, who
hoped to make any alterations to the bill privately through work with the House,
thus avoiding any costly public statements by the President against the popular
bill. This strategy relied on “stiffen[ing] [the] back[s]” of the House conferees,
particularly when it came to standing up against the Title II deadline.253 Possibly
247. Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1, at 2.
248. Id.
249. Memorandum from Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, to President
Richard M. Nixon (Oct. 1, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-127, at 3–4) (“Columnists have noted the
Administration’s silence on the Senate bill. Numerous inquiries concerning the Administration’s position have
been made by the press. Senator Muskie has publicly requested the Administration’s support and had stated that
silence can only be construed as nonsupport. I would certainly not recommend that the Administration be
pressured politically into supporting an unwise or irresponsible bill. However, in my judgment, neither
description can be used to characterize this bill. I fear that if the Administration does not embrace this
monumental piece of legislation, its credibility in the environmental field will be seriously undermined. And I
also fear that it will not be clear that the basics of the legislation are the Administration’s proposals.”).
250. Memorandum, General Strategy—Air Pollution Conference Committee, supra note 239 (supporting
the House version).
251. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM., at 5 (Dec. 18, 1970), A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 147 (“The conference substitute retains the Senate provision
for citizen suits.”).
252. STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE, at 55, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 205 (1974) (“The House bill did not include a provision for citizen suits.”).
253. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, Deputy Secretary to the President for Domestic Affairs, to Ken
Cole, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs 2–3 (Nov. 4, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 1-31)
(“The political realities are such that the Muskie version will carry the day. . . . If the President proposes a
compromise, although it has a slight chance of passage, he will be open to the charge from the public of being
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caving to pressure from the Administration, House conferees maintained their
opposition to key parts of the Senate bill.254 Muskie was furious, not only
because everyone seemed to have “lost their memory,” but also because he
feared it made him look foolish as he had already declared that the issue was
settled.255
Controversy rattled the conference as Democrat John Jarman on the House
side was revealed in the press to have a potential conflict of interest due to his
family’s owning auto dealerships in Oklahoma.256 The process dragged on for
another month, and the elephant in the room of auto emissions was put off and
neglected, similar to the way it was saved for last, as it were, even during the
committee process.257 One morning session, the House appeared to finally take
a definitive stand on 1975 standards, and offered their ultimatum: an amendment
that would provide for unlimited extensions of the 1975 statutory standards
deadline. This, they hoped, would give the auto industry room to continue
business as usual without threat of total collapse, while still granting the Senate
the standards in the Act itself.258
At this point, Muskie and the Senate conferees could have folded and
acquiesced earlier arguments about keeping the extension and conditions for it
as narrow as possible.259 However, because the terms of the amendment
proposed were anathema to the policy goals of the Subcommittee, the Senate
conferees refused the offer and Muskie considered a compromise, ordering
Senate staff to formulate alternatives to be presented in a caucus meeting during
recess.260 Billings (who also acted as a negotiator in the conference
committee),261 Jorling, and the ten other Senate staff members presented four
alternatives.262 As Billings recalled, the debate was “turgid” and conferees were
tired, largely unresponsive, and confused about what the staff was proposing in
terms of new technical proposals.263
In huddle, some Senate conferees now seemed to have been willing to
accept a compromise and change their original position to a more moderate one,
and each of the four proposed alternatives would have provided an additional
one-year deadline extension beyond the Senate’s one-year extension.264 This
too soft on the auto industry. . . . Muskie will probably dare the Administration to take a position and charge us
with being silent. . . . I think John Ehrlichman should discuss this whole matter with the President since his mood
might very easily be to simply take Muskie on with an open statement saying he is irresponsible. I say this even
though I do not agree with the strategy.”).
254. See generally Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1, at 1–2.
255. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57, at 13.
256. Id.
257. See Public Works Hearings, supra note 131, at 92.
258. See generally Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1, at 2–3.
259. See generally Public Works Hearings, supra note 91, at 53.
260. Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1, at 2–3.
261. Brief of Billings and Jorling as Amici Curiae, supra note 227, at 2.
262. Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1, at 2–3.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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seemed to Muskie in particular, however, to provide too much leeway to the
executive branch, which violated a core principle of nondelegation driving the
Act’s intent to strip enforcement discretion from the Act.265
However, Billings gave credit to Muskie alone at this critical juncture for
urging the Senate conferees to maintain their original position. Faced with the
additional deadline extension, Muskie insisted, by Billings’ colorful
characterization:
Well, god dammit, I’m not going to go in the House and propose that we gut
the goddamn bill. And I don’t think anybody in this conference committee is
going to go in there and tell the House that we want to gut the goddamn bill.
What have you guys been doing for the last two hours?266

Billings also recalled Muskie as also saying concerning substantive
concessions,
I will not accept that—I will not accept a deadline extension beyond the
Senate bill. The Senate has called for a deadline of 1975 and giving the
automobile industry an additional year if they can prove that the [emission
control technology] does not exist. Anything beyond that is unacceptable and
I think the country ought to be so informed.267

Backs stiffened, Senate conferees rallied behind Muskie and agreed eight
to zero to support their original bill.268 Not even moderate Committee Chair
Jennings Randolph, who “would have killed for that extra year,” voiced
opposition.269 By one account offered by Billings, at this point an unnamed staff
person turned to Muskie and said that “that killed the bill,” insisting that the
House would put the brakes on the whole process.270 “[T]hen let the bill die,”
Muskie responded, “this is the public issue . . . this is what the public expects
and this is what the public should get or there will be no bill at all.”271
Returning to the full conference committee that same day, the Senate reupped its adamancy and refusal to compromise as Muskie offered the
compromise, which was, in Billings’ words, something along the lines of “if you
guys can’t accept our proposition, we’ll see you next year.”272 Despite its earlier
265. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122 (“One of the ways of reading the Clean Air Act
is an expression of lack of faith in the executive branch by the legislative branch. They lock you into these
standards and time frames in which you must hit them. Essentially saying, ‘We’ll do that. Your job is to enforce
what we have already done. You can grant them one year then they have to come back to us.’ To me, that is a
useful way to read the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act—an expression of a lack of trust of the executive
branch by the legislative branch.”).
266. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57, at 14 (quoting Sen. Edmund Muskie (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Billings and others insist that Muskie was no stranger to colorful language, and so there is
reason to believe that this characterization of Muskie’s mannerisms may not be too far off the mark.
267. Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Sen. Edmund Muskie) (internal
quotations omitted).
268. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57; see also Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1,
at 3.
269. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57, at 14.
270. Memorandum from Leon Billings, supra note 1, at 3.
271. Id.
272. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
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hesitancy to accept the strict statutory deadlines and standards, the House
delegation voted to accept the Senate terms, later reporting to the full House that
this change was the “[b]ig difference” from what they had passed earlier.273
The Senate, Muskie most of all, could claim victory on the core issue of
the Clean Air Act, later claiming it “no less” than the Senate bill on key issues.274
Despite equivocation from some other Senators and staff members throughout
the conference process, Muskie recognized the political necessity of the rigid
deadline pushed initially by Eagleton. Returning to the Senate, he emphasized
this victory and seemed to take a victory lap, stating, “[t]he deadline has been
retained. That deadline is January 1, 1975, for carbon monoxide and
hydrocarbons, and January 1, 1976, for oxides of nitrogen. I repeat, that deadline
has been retained.”275
Interestingly, both chambers of Congress viewed Muskie and the Senate’s
bill in conference as “tougher,” and saw the Senate conferees in the position of
fending off compromises that might weaken the bill. Muskie was mentioned by
name and credited with protecting the heart of the Act, even in the House. “A
number of us attempted to amend H.R. 17255 to include [a statutory 1975
deadline] when it was before the House of Representatives in June of this year.
We were narrowly defeated; however, Senator Muskie was successful in the
Senate.”276 He is celebrated for fending off perceived attacked from industry “as
espoused by the administration.”277 Similarly, he was commended “without
restraint” by a co-conferee during Senate consideration.278 Counter-intuitively,
one element of the bill, which made it so “tough,” was the result of the House’s
contributions in conference; although the Senate bill was the primary mold after
which the final Act was patterned, the House contributed language increasing
the role of the federal government in section 110.279
Other Representatives doubled down on taking the Senate’s side, calling
the House’s efforts “inadequate—a half step where 10 giant steps were
required,” and recognizing the “the much stronger provisions of the Senatepassed Clean Air Act amendments.”280 The House conferees were generally
lauded in their own chamber of Congress only insofar as they acquiesced and
laid down to the Senate: “I want to commend the House conferees for agreeing
273. Interestingly, some in the House pushed the conferees upon their return and questioned whether the
1975 deadline would come too late. See HOUSE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM., at 8–9 (Dec.
18, 1970), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 117–18 (1974)
(“[T]his grants 5 years for allowing the automobile industry to get instruments in the automobiles which will
prevent the emission of foul air. . . . [Is it] absolutely necessary to allow that long a period of time?”).
274. Id. at 123.
275. Id. at 128.
276. Id. at 119.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 142.
279. Compare H.R. 15848, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 108(c)(1) (1970), with § 110(a)(3) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3) (2018)).
280. HOUSE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM., at 10 (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 119 (1974).
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to accept the stronger Senate-passed provisions in so many cases,”
Representative Vanik of Ohio stated, closing the record and adding to the House
chorus of praise for the Senate in general and Muskie in particular. “Their
action,” Vanik said, “and the action of the Congress in passing this bill will be—
next to solving the dread disease of cancer—the single most important thing that
the Congress can do to improve the health of the American people.”281
With the agreement of the conferees secured and the conference committee
results presented to both chambers of Congress, the bill moved next to an
increasingly tense and skeptical White House. Months of anxious memos from
competing factions within the White House urging the President to either accept
or reject the bill were coming to a head, and Nixon’s commitment to hang on to
the environmental boat and stay competitive with Muskie would undergo its first
major test.
B. SIGNING AND THE “MUSKIE BROUHAHA”
As 1971 grew nearer, pressure mounted, and anxiety of a potential pocket
veto peaked. As questions about the fate of the bill loomed, Senator Cooper and
Committee Chair James Randolph, decided to go to the White House in an effort
to convince President Nixon to sign the bill.282 While there are no official notes
of what transpired between the two in their meeting, the Clean Air Act was, of
course, signed. Billings believes that Cooper played an “instrumental” role in
lobbying the President to get the bill signed before the end of year deadline.283
Regardless, this episode demonstrates the persistent efforts of the Subcommittee
to see the bill through.
Even before conference committee began, some within the Administration
were equivocating on earlier resistance and seemed willing to accept whatever
bill was presented, despite an earlier resolve to weaken it.284 At this time,
Ruckelshaus, new to his post as the first EPA Administrator, seized on the
opportunity to put pressure on Nixon. In a public statement, Ruckelshaus lauded
bipartisan cooperation and the results of the conference committee and
expressed that he was pleased to see far-reaching proposals like those which
281. Id. at 120.
282. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
283. Id. (“John Sherman Cooper and James Randolph went to the White House right around Christmas and
pleaded with the President to sign it. And Cooper, I think, was instrumental. I don’t know what took place in
that meeting. All I know is after they came back . . . the President had a signing ceremony and Muskie wasn’t
invited.”).
284. Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, Deputy Sec’y to the President for Domestic Aff., to Ed Morgan
(Jan. 7, 1971) (on file with authors as Nixon Online row 7) (“It really doesn’t make a heck of a lot of difference
whose legislation passes, the President’s or Muskie’s, as long as we are visible. Unlike revenue sharing and
reorganization of the Government, we don’t win or loose [sic] in a clear-cut fashion on this issue as long as the
President will go places and do things on the environment”). Memorandum from John C. Whitaker, Deputy
Sec’y to the President for Domestic Aff., to President Richard Nixon, by John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the
President for Domestic Aff., at 2 (Sept. 21, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 1-27) (Whitaker lobbies Nixon
to accept the bill publicly but recommends sending White House Congressional liaisons to lobby to weaken the
bill in secret).
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Nixon sent to Congress in February accepted,285 thereby whittling away at any
window of opportunity the President might have had to divorce himself from the
bill and justify a pocket veto.286
Ruckelshaus also implicitly endorsed the citizen suit provision by
discussing the role of individual citizens, and chided Congress for not working
quickly enough on a water bill.287 Russell Train, although he differed from
Ruckelshaus and explicitly lobbied against the citizen suit provision, still pushed
for the administration’s support of the bill, insisting that it was more or less what
Nixon wanted anyways, despite being “extremely tough,” and holding that
signing it would give Nixon some leverage against Muskie on the
environment.288 Even the Office of Management and Budget, the de facto rival
of the Train-led environmental faction in the Nixon White House, accepted the
bill over the prospect of a re-do the following year.289 Although Nixon and many
in his administrations were wont to cite the potentially deleterious effects of
environmental regulation on jobs and industry, the particulars of the Act were
also explicitly supported by the AFL-CIO, as well.290
After almost managing to avoid signing the Act by strange circumstances
and a final back-stiffening, Nixon was ready to put the Clean Air Act behind
him.291 Even after deciding to sign the bill, Nixon leveraged the opportunity for
political points and opted to exclude Muskie from the ceremony.292 Staff
reported that Nixon did not want Muskie “hogg[ing] the cameras,”293 and the
White House generally tried to move on from what one staffer termed the
“Muskie brouhaha.”294 It is worth commenting that while it would be impossible
to know Nixon’s intentions at the time, he was clearly by no means anxious to
get the Clean Air Act signed as soon as possible, as his previous rhetoric on the
environment may have indicated. Muskie, as it turns out, was home for the
285. Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 17, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 1193).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 2.
288. Memorandum from Russell Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, to President Richard
Nixon 2 (Oct. 1, 1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 2-127).
289. Memorandum from Wilfred H. Rommel, OMB Counsel, to President Richard Nixon 5–6 (Dec. 29,
1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 1-47).
290. Letter from Am. Federation of Labor, to Jennings Randolph, Chairman, Sen. Pub. Works Comm. (Aug.
21, 1970), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 715 (1974).
291. The following year in 1971, John Whitaker commented to Leon Billings that in reality, the bill had
fallen and been lost behind the radiator in the Oval Office, a fact almost used to cover for a pocket veto. Interview
with Leon Billings, supra note 57 (“Whitaker told me that the Clean Air Act had been in the President’s office
for him to sign and it was sitting on a radiator and it fell behind the radiator and that’s why it almost was pocket
vetoed.”).
292. James M. Naughton, President Signs Bill to Cut Auto Fumes 90% by 1977, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1971,
at 1; Aldo Beckman, Nixon Signs Clean Air Measure, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 1971, at 2.
293. Memorandum from Charles W. Colson, Special Counsel to the President, to Dwight Chapin, Special
Assistant to the President (Jan. 12, 1971) (on file with authors as Nixon 1-54).
294. Id. (Colson refers to the controversy of whether or not to invite Muskie—Nixon didn’t want to—as the
“‘Muskie’ brouhaha”). This term is also used as a title chapter in J. BROOKS FLIPPEN, NIXON AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2000).

May 2020]

THE MAKING OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

943

holidays anyway, and would have been unavailable for the signing.295
Nonetheless, Nixon succeeded in signaling his political stance.
IV. ENFORCEMENT AND OVERSIGHT
As President Nixon signed the Clean Air Act into law at the very close of
1970, it was not altogether clear what its practical effect would be. Although the
language passed by Congress was made up of largely clear and concise
language, how well the Act would be administered and interpreted would make
all the difference in determining whether the air would be any cleaner by the end
of the “decade of the environment.”
Efforts to undermine the Clean Air Act grew in the coming years as the
environmental thrust dimmed and the Arab Oil Crisis flared.296 Just four months
after his hesitant signing of the Clean Air Act, Nixon sat in his office with auto
executives to tell them, “I’m just telling you my personal views. . . . [V]iews are,
are, are frankly, uh, whether it’s the environment or pollution or Naderism or
consumerism, are extremely pro-business. Uh, we are fighting, frankly, a[nd]
delaying action in many instances.”297
It is in this highly contrarian environment of the Nixon Administration that
enforcement of the Clean Air Act would have to occur. The first two
Administrators of the EPA, Ruckelshaus and Train, were pitted in the middle of
the environmental fight as it was raging at its closest to the President. Without
considering what was at risk politically, any study of EPA enforcement decisions
in the 1970s lacks color and depth; thus, we hope to put the early EPA in context
of an evolving political atmosphere.
Part IV.A investigates the role of the EPA’s first Administrator, William
Ruckelshaus, in becoming a “sheriff” and enforcer of environmental law and
clean air deadlines, giving the EPA ethos as “the gorilla in the closet.” Part IV.B
follows through the service of the EPA’s second Administrator, Russell Train,
295. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
296. See infra Subpart IV.B; see also Carothers, supra note 46, at 717 (“When EPA’s health-based lead
regulations were undergoing final interagency review in the fall of 1973, long lines were forming at service
stations as a result of the Arab oil embargo following the Yom Kippur War. . . . As EPA Deputy Administrator
John Quarles recalled in his firsthand account of EPA’s battle with White House staff in November 1973, one
of the major lead processors ran full-page newspaper ads in the Washington Post and the New York Times
claiming that the rules would waste one million barrels of oil per day. Although this wild claim was never
substantiated, EPA agreed with the staff of the Office of Management and Budget to change the lead reduction
schedule to reduce the first-year impacts and extend the final compliance date, while achieving a slightly greater
level of total lead reduction.” (footnotes omitted)); Oren, supra note 46, at 10842 (The 1973 Arab oil embargo
“led to many states abandoning their ambitious goals for emission reduction.”); Reitze, Jr., supra note 46, at
1602 (“The program to protect areas already having clean air was bogged down by EPA’s failure to implement
the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) program. At the same time, unemployment had grown to nine
percent, there was double digit inflation, and the nation was struggling with the aftermath of the 1973 Arab oil
embargo. It was in this context that Congress, in 1977, attempted to redirect EPA toward achieving the goals of
the CAA.”).
297. Unpublished recording: Conversation between former President Richard M. Nixon and John D.
Ehrlichman, Lide Anthony Iacocca, and Ronald L. Ziegler, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, Tape Subject Log
11 (Apr. 27, 1971) (on file with authors).
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fresh from the Council on Environmental Quality, as he fended off
Administration efforts to weaken the Act by exempting energy generation from
regulation, permitting unfiltered tall stacks, and allowing significant
deterioration of air quality in attaining areas. Although they offered different
leadership styles, the tenure of both Administrators complemented one another
and were critical in establishing a legitimate and binding Clean Air Act
enforcement regime. The role of congressional oversight by key players in the
Senate Public Works Committee is maintained throughout this Part, along with
references to key decisions by the judiciary that affected EPA programs.
A. KEEPING THE GORILLA IN THE CLOSET: WILLIAM RUCKELSHAUS
In its first years of operation, largely due to the efforts of its first
Administrator, the EPA sought a reputation of being “fair but firm.”298 This
image was beneficial for Nixon, who himself publicly framed William
Ruckelshaus as “a fair crusader . . . for clean air, for clean water, and a better
environment for all Americans” at his swearing-in.299 Ruckelshaus, from his first
press conference as Administrator of the EPA, however, publicly leaned towards
a “tough” image, using language which fostered an image as a sort of sheriff of
pollution: “We see the Environmental Protection Agency’s primary
responsibility as enforcement. . . . [A]nd we are going after the polluters.”300 A
tough stance was necessary: the EPA was battling the same public cynicism of
government that had forced the strong statute through Congress in the first place,
and Ruckelshaus was given the Herculean task of convincing the public that the
Republican Administration could respond to the public over industry
pressures.301
He even broke from Nixon’s preferred method of discussing the
environment and pollution by specifically citing industry as a serious polluter.302
However, at the time Ruckelshaus was speaking, the EPA was armed with very
little, having only been created a half-year before; furthermore, policy tools and

298. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & GEN. COUNS., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE FIRST
TWO YEARS: A REVIEW OF EPA’S ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 2 (1970); see also JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT
AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 22 (2012).
299. President Richard M. Nixon, Remarks at the Swearing in of William D. Ruckelshaus as Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 4, 1970), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarksthe-swearing-william-d-ruckelshaus-administrator-the-environmental-protection.
300. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, The White House Press Conference of William
D. Ruckelshaus, Assistant Attorney Gen., and Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Envtl. Quality 2 (Nov. 6,
1970) (on file with authors as Nixon 1-9).
301. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122, at 5, 7 (“That overall attitude and this cynicism
about government that was fed by the Vietnam war were running so deep among so many people. . . . We had
to show them that the government was in fact concerned about their health and about the environment, and that
we would take action where necessary to ensure that their health was protected”).
302. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, supra note 300, at 5 (“[I]ndustry is one of the
problems.”).
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staff aside, Ruckelshaus himself did not have formal management education.303
Still, Ruckelshaus remembers being “excited and very energized” to seize on
Clean Air and legitimize the new independent agency.304
The first step taken in translating the Clean Air Act took the form of
preliminary investigation to determine the state of compliance under previous
iterations of the law. Requests for emission levels at existing facilities were
coupled with some stack tests and the first notices of violation of auto pollution
standards.305 The Clean Air Act provided the EPA with some of its first exercises
in developing coherent national infrastructure.306 Having been built out of the
scraps of fifteen disparate agencies,307 the new agency would have to create
necessary structures to study, monitor, permit, regulate, and litigate pollution
based explicitly on statutory mandate. Needless to say, the first two years of the
EPA were formative and would do much to define the overall trajectory of the
agency in terms of reputation, legitimacy, and organization.308
Legitimizing the mission of the EPA was made especially difficult by the
fact that, even at the time the Clean Air Act was passed, it seemed likely that the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) established in Title I, in
addition to the ninety percent pollution reduction standard of Title II, would be
difficult, if not impossible, to meet by the set deadline of 1975 or 1976.309
Moreover, unlike prior air and water pollution laws, the new Clean Air Act
required a degree of federal coordination and regional specialization that did not
yet exist.310
The Clean Air Act’s State Implementation Plan (SIP) structure, the
practical outcome of Muskie’s vision of shared federalism, necessitated
relationship-building with state environmental regulatory agencies, which at
times pushed back against the federalization of pollution control, seeing
themselves in part as defenders of regional industry productivity, while still
building a federal “enforcement presence.”311 The “tough” reputation that the
303. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122, at 3 (“And, I had so little management experience
at the time. . . . One of our people, named Howard Messner, who has since died, brought in an organizational
chart and said, ‘Now, you move these boxes around wherever you think they ought to go.’ I said, ‘I have never
seen an organizational chart before. How the hell would I know where these boxes go?’”).
304. Id. at 2.
305. MINTZ, supra note 298, at 26 (“EPA initiated information-gathering procedures, including . . . a limited
number of stack tests. The Agency issued its first formal notices of violation and administrative orders to
identified sources of air pollution and began to enforce the limitations on automobile-generated pollution”
(footnote omitted)).
306. Arguably, the EPA laid the groundwork for a reputation of enforcement with water regulation under
the Refuse Act. Id. at 22. The EPA garnered publicity, for example, by concentrating efforts and holding
conferences in major cities. Id.
307. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122, at 3.
308. MINTZ, supra note 298, at 23 (“For many participants in EPA’s newly established enforcement
program, the first two years were an intensely exciting yet a hectic time. . . . The Agency’s first two years were
a formative time for its enforcement programs.”).
309. See Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122.
310. See MINTZ, supra note 298, at 26.
311. Id. at 36.
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EPA had worked to achieve, in addition to the comprehensive nature of the
Clean Air Act and Ruckelshaus’ publicized intention to enforce it, resulted in
many state pollution control agencies viewing the EPA as “unnecessarily
stringent and overly aggressive.”312 Even in the absence of any antagonistic
relationship with the states, a lack of experience resulted in many cases in
unspecific and uninformed SIP preparation, and EPA staff was forced to
dedicate much of its labor and efforts to reviewing individual facilities’
compliance schedules and micromanaging pollution emissions.313
Thus, it was necessary for Ruckelshaus to manage the development of a
national regulatory framework that could execute the mandates of the Act while
still fostering buy-in from the ten separate administrative sub-regions. Without
such a framework laid out while the Act was still in vogue (that is, before antienvironmental tendencies became more entrenched among conservative
politicians), reasonable enforcement of the Clean Air Act would have needed to
come into being with much greater external political resistance; without the
momentum Ruckelshaus provided by striking while the iron was still hot, a
successful program would have been much less feasible.
Ruckelshaus’ most outstanding decision, certainly bolstering the integrity
of the Clean Air Act, was his May 1972 decision to deny the auto industry’s
request for a one-year extension of the 1975 auto standards on the grounds that
the unavailability of the necessary technology was not sufficiently
demonstrated. Despite the political pressure and efforts by industry to sway the
agency, Ruckelshaus remained convinced that the deadline could be met.314 By
taking a stand on the 1975 deadlines, Ruckelshaus proved that the Clean Air Act
could have real effects on industry, and that the theory of technology forcing
was more than statutory postulation. The agency was going to show itself, as
Ruckelshaus put it, as a true “gorilla in the closet.”315
This is not to say, however, that the EPA, even under the leadership of
Ruckelshaus, executed the newly legislated environmental will of the legislature
flawlessly or without some struggle exerted by congressional oversight.
Congress continually asserted its role in keeping the EPA in line, pulling on the
opposite end of the rope as the conservative and incrementalistic White House.
The Public Works Committee, in particular, sought to keep the EPA and its
leadership close and maintain something of a working relationship; Ruckelshaus
recalled Senators Muskie and Baker as being particularly responsive to his
concerns and willing to co-sponsor proposed amendments.316

312. Id. at 24.
313. Id. at 26–27 (“Once the SIPs became enforceable, EPA devoted a good deal of its staff’s time to
determining how to apply these requirements to the numerous industrial and municipal sources that caused
pollution. . . . The Agency also reviewed the acceptability of proposed SIP compliance schedules for many
individual facilities.”).
314. See Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122.
315. Id.
316. Id. (“But, from time to time, I would bring up issues to [Muskie]; he would be responsive to them.”).
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Still, the Committee was not afraid to slap the wrists of the EPA when it
felt necessary; after all, the Senate was skeptical of the administration and its
alleged long-term commitment to the environment. In 1971 and 1972, Ed
Muskie’s Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee acted as the primary vehicle
for oversight and, in some instances, a rebuke of the EPA when it failed to meet
Congress’ lofty expectations.317 Beginning even with the Act’s passage, Muskie
and Eagleton announced their intentions to be vigilant concerning the
administration of the legislation, citing the administration’s resistance to the
Senate bill and the Richardson letter.318
Muskie in particular sought to ensure that the “spirit of the law” was
observed, and that the EPA would not make unnecessary concessions to the auto
industry or place undue costs on the consumer.319 The Senate accused the
Administration’s “hesitancy to enforce the Clean Air Act” to be “abetting” the
industry attack, implicating Ruckelshaus and drawing a through-line to Nixon’s
meetings in late 1969 to supposedly make a deal putting off auto emissions
regulation and “permit dirty cars for ten years.”320 Even the arguable magnum
opus of Ruckelshaus’ Clean Air Act administration, refusing the 1975 standards
deadline extension, was criticized by the Senate as being a “superficially tough
stance,” which was undermined or reversed by what the Subcommittee saw as
unpublicized actions to the detriment of the Act.321
Even in the face of some Congressional rebuke, Ruckelshaus was, in the
view of Train, ultimately “respected in Congress” in addition to being “wellliked by the environmental community . . . display[ing] enough independence to
please the public and keep the White House a bit nervous.”322 Later scholars
317. Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970—Part I, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Air and Water Pollution of the Comm. on Pub. Works, 92d Cong., at 224-28, 236, 243 (1972) (statement of Dr.
John T. Middleton, Deputy Assistant Administrator, EPA); see also MINTZ, supra note 298, at 24 (“Along with
oversight investigations of EPA's Clean Air Act implementation by Senator Edmund Muskie's Air and Water
Pollution Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Works, the hearings arose in the context of a general
upsurge in congressional oversight of the executive branch, as well as open disparagement, by some members
of Congress, of early decisions by EPA that proved politically unpopular.”).
318. See SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM. (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM.
ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 138 (1974).
319. Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970—Part 3 (Title II): Before the Subcomm. on
Air and Water Pollution of the Comm. On Pub. Works, 92d Cong., at 1361 (1971) (statement of Sen. Edmund
Muskie, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Comm. of Public Works).
320. Memorandum to Files, Violation of Title II of the Clean Air Act, supra note 56 (“The Nixon
Administration opposed enactment of the 1970 Clean Air Amendments, and a veto of this Congressional
initiative to protect the public health was threatened. . . . The industry attack is being abetted by the
Administration’s hesitancy to enforce the Clean Air Act. . . . In late 1969, auto industry executives gathered for
a secret meeting with the President at the White House to make a deal to permit dirty cars for ten years.”).
321. Id. It was argued that emission control devices authorized by EPA for 1973 turn off under normal
conditions, violating Title II Section 203, and EPA had failed, in the eyes of the committee, to visibly enforce
it. Manufacturers provided false information knowingly, violating Section 113, without meeting serious
consequences. EPA would shift catalyst replacement costs to consumers, despite good practice suggested by
Ruckelshaus that costs be incorporated at the time of purchase. Taken together, these charges lead to the polemic
by 1973 that “the clear intent of the Clean Air Act is not being carried out.” Id.
322. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 159.

948

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:901

concluded that it may have been the “glare of intense publicity” which aided
Ruckelshaus in kicking enforcement measures into second gear.323
Still, congressional oversight alone was not always enough to overcome
the massive political forces weighing on the EPA, and at times, the courts were
forced to intervene and mandate action in the spirit of the Committee’s
intentions.
Judge Malcolm Wilkey, of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,324 captured
this trend in powerful language in 1976 when he asserted that “recent history
would indicate that the prime mover behind implementation of the Clean Air
Act has not been Congress or EPA, but the courts—specifically this court.”325
As evidence of his point, Judge Wilkey cited Ruckelshaus’ own comments in
justification of controversial auto emissions in which the Administrator punted
responsibility for enforcement decisions to the judiciary after NRDC v. EPA,326
stating, “I know this is controversial, but I am under a court order and this is the
only demonstrable way to meet the national clean air standards.”327
Ruckelshaus also recalled this pressure from the courts in the case of courtmandated transportation controls in Los Angeles, for example—although the
EPA argued that it would be impossible to meet NAAQS deadlines in the area
by the 1975 or 1976 deadline, the court nevertheless demanded that EPA
mandate strict controls in California’s implementation plan at risk of
contempt.328 When Ruckelshaus, in turn, announced EPA’s intentions to remove
eighty percent of automobiles from L.A. and was met with laughter from a room
of reporters, he shielded the agency from criticism by citing the court’s ethos:
“It’s not a joke. It is the law and a requirement from a judge.”329 It is worth
considering, however, that the steel in the court’s spine was likely not entirely
its own. The drafters of the Senate bill discussed above deserve sustained credit,
being responsible for removing excess discretion from the courts and mandating
implementation of the Act’s standards.
323. MINTZ, supra note 298, at 23.
324. It is worth mentioning that Judge Wilkey also authored the opinion which accepted Ruckelshaus’
decision to ban DDT. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
325. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 88 n.88 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
326. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968, 970–71 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
327. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 88 n.88 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (quoting Karen Elliott House, Lost in a Smog
Bank, WALL ST. J., Jan.16, 1976, at 4.
328. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122 (“[W]e were sued in Los Angeles for failure to
implement the Clean Air Act. . . . We said, ‘We are working hard at it, but there is no way we can get there by
the deadline’ in our arguments in the courts. The judge said, ‘impose transportation controls.’ That is when we
came up with getting 80% of the cars off the road. The judge threatened to hold me in contempt and put me in
jail if I didn’t impose the transportation controls.”); see also Dwyer, supra note 148, at 1202.
329. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122 (“The first question after I announced what we
were doing was, ‘Is this a joke?’ . . . I said, ‘It’s not a joke. It is the law and a requirement from a judge.’ I did
not say this, but in my mind, the judge had been correctly reading the law. It is what it says. So, if that is what I
have to do to stay out of jail, that is what I would do. I was convinced that we would get relief as a result of that.
And, we did. I did let the White House know what I was doing. I wanted the White House to understand and
L.A to understand and the Congress to understand . . . . Don’t blame the judge. He stuck with the law that was
in front of him.”).
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Another such case of judicial strengthening-through-interpretation of the
Act took the form of a strong policy of antidegradation, also known as
prevention of significant deterioration (PSD), which would prevent degradation
of air quality conditions in areas where federal standards were already met.330
The language of the Act itself contained no provision or mandate for the
prevention of significant deterioration in attaining areas.331 The closest it came,
however, to such a policy, was the language “protect and enhance” found in the
Act’s declaration of purpose.332
This phrasing was carried over from the 1967 predecessor legislation.333 In
1972, Muskie publicly insisted that the EPA’s failure to adopt a non-degradation
policy was a failure to recognize Congress’ intentions since the 1967
amendments.334 Obligated to enforce the earlier legislation, Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) promulgated rules in 1969 that recognized “air quality
standards which, even if fully implemented, would result in significant
deterioration of air quality in any substantial portion of an air quality region
clearly would conflict with this expressed purpose of the law.”335
This policy was reported to the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution and the House Committee of Public Health and Welfare,336 and
congressional intent to carry over such a policy was made rather explicit, at least
by the Senate in their report accompanying the 1970 amendments: “In areas
where current air pollution levels are already equal to, or better, than the air
quality goals, the Secretary shall not approve any implementation plan which

330. See generally Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492 (2018).
331. Id.
332. Id. at § 7470(2).
333. See Martin & Symington, supra note 34, at 243–44 (highlighting main purposes of 1967 amendments
to the Clean Air Act); Arthur C. Stern, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: A Critical Review, 27 J. AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 440, 440 (1977) (“There is approximately a ten year history of the development of
the concept of ‘prevention of significant deterioration’ (PSD) or ‘nondegradation’ of clean air areas and the
implementation of this concept in legislation and regulations.”); Victoria Tkachenko, Prevention of Significant
Deterioration: The 1978 Regulations, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L REV. 275, 275 (1979) (“Building on [the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970] . . . the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 . . . adopted a PSD program and set up a
procedure for classifying clean-air areas” (footnotes omitted)).
334. EDMUND S. MUSKIE, 92D CONG., REPORT ON S. SUBCOMM. ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION ACTIVITY,
(1972) (on file with authors as Muskie 3-7).
335. NAT’L AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., U. S. DEPT. OF HEW [HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE],
GUIDELINES FOR THE DEV. OF AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION PLANS, Part I § 1.51, at 7 (1969)
(cited in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
336. Hearings on Air Pollution Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the S. Pub. Works
Comm., 91st Cong. 132–33 (1970) (statement of Hon. Robert H. Finch, Sec’y, Dept. of Health, Educ., &
Welfare) (“Accordingly, it has been and will continue to be our view that implementation plans that would
permit significant deterioration in air quality in any area would be in conflict with this provision.”); Hearings
on Air Pollution Control and Solid Wastes Recycling Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health and Welfare of the
H.R. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 280, 287 (1970) (statement of Hon. Robert H.
Finch, Sec’y, Dept. of Health, Educ., & Welfare) (“It will continue to be our view that implementation plans
that would permit significant deterioration of air quality in any area would be in conflict with this provision of
the Act.”).

950

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:901

does not provide, to the maximum extent practicable, for the continued
maintenance of such ambient air quality.”337
When enforcement authority was transferred over to Ruckelshaus’ EPA,
PSD rules were not implemented, against the wishes of the Committee,338 and
rules were set permitting states to submit plans that would allow clean air areas
to be degraded, so long as the plans were merely “adequate to prevent such
ambient pollution levels from exceeding such secondary standard.”339
In Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, however, Judge Pratt of the D.C. District
Court ruled that the term “protect and enhance,” carried over from the 1967
amendments, not only provided EPA with justification for antidegradation, but
were actually grounds for the invalidation of any SIP approval which did not
conform to antidegradation standards.340 More than a justification for such a
policy, the prior rules, in conjunction with the Act’s text, provided an affirmative
obligation to prevent significant deterioration, according to the court.341 The
court further argued that “the public interest in this case strongly supports the
legislative policy of clean air and the non-degradation of areas in which clean
air exists.”342 The injunction provided against permitting SIPs, which would
allow deterioration in areas of attainment, was affirmed by the Supreme Court
on June 11, 1973 in a four-to-four vote without written opinion, and the EPA
scrapped relevant SIPs.343
B. SEEING THE CLEAN AIR ACT THROUGH: RUSSELL TRAIN
After Ruckelshaus was asked by Nixon to resign from EPA in April 1973
to take the place of J. Edgar Hoover as Acting Director of FBI, Russel Train
moved in from the President’s Council on Environmental Quality, where he
quickly found himself venturing into the increasingly “murky” political waters
of environmental protection at EPA.344 His nomination was supported even by
the hard-to-please Ed Muskie, who lauded Train’s “background and experience
337. S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 2 (1970). The House report contains no such language or indication of intent
for PSD. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1146, at 1, 2, 5 (1970); see also SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE
CONF. COMM. (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 119 (1974).
338. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 92d Cong. 351–52 (Jan. 27–28, 1972) (cited in Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. at 254) (unpublished
transcript)).
339. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. at 254; see also 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(b) (2020).
340. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. at 256 (“[I]t is our judgement that the Clean Air Act of 1970 is based in
important part on a policy of non-degradation of existing clean air.”); see also McNollgast, supra note 16, at 31
(arguing that Sierra Club was poorly decided because Judge Pratt misinterpreted judicial intent by failing “to
honor the preferences of pivotal members of the enacting coalition, and thereby overturned their legislative
agreement”).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 257.
343. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
344. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 156 (“What I did not see clearly . . . was the extent to which the environmental
honeymoon had come to an end and how much of a conflict between environmental and energy objectives would
characterize the years immediately ahead at the EPA.”).
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to vigorously pursue” the job with “independence and objectivity.”345 Even
bomb-thrower Leon Billings, who had arguably higher standards, spoke
glowingly of Train, calling him “beyond a doubt, the most important
environmental advocate in any administration in which I was involved,” and the
“best administrator the EPA has ever had bar none.”346
In fact, it was none other than the Senate Public Works Committee which
conducted Train’s confirmation hearing, which he cleared eighty-five to zero,
further showing their sustained oversight role.347 Train’s easy clearance of the
Senate confirmation hearing also demonstrate his popularity in Washington.
This popularity may have saved Train during more turbulent periods, in fact; a
less popular Administrator may have been more expendable in the eyes of a
desperate and tail-spinning President looking to reign in the executive.
When Train entered the EPA, the environment’s popularity was
backsliding, and the “honeymoon period” of the ecology movement was seen to
have already passed by. Unlike Ruckelshaus, Train considered himself an
environmentalist by the common understanding of the term.348 Also unlike
Ruckelshaus, Train would be forced to wage war uphill for the EPA. The
“[A]gency’s first chief, William Ruckelshaus, waged anti-pollution offensives
with strong public support. Mr. Train, on the other hand, found himself
defending the environmental movement and his agency against attack . . . . But
Mr. Train is not giving ground easily,” the Wall Street Journal reported.349 An
environmental reporter described the shift during Train’s time in a similar way:
Gone are the banner, slogan days, and much of the glamour that surrounded
a new agency born of a popular cause. Gone too is the relatively quick and
highly visible environmental offensive that produced the early wave of
regulation. . . . No longer was environment the golden child, the exclusive
and favorite national concern.350

Statutory deadlines of 1975 imposed by the Clean Air Act appeared on the
horizon just in time for the zenith of an energy crisis which threatened to carry
with it economic downturn in the face of trending inflation, and the White House
no longer masked its intentions to roll back environmental regulations in greentinted language. Nixon needed allies in industry as his Presidency spiraled.351
345. Id. at 156-57 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
346. Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57.
347. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 157.
348. Interview with William Ruckelshaus, supra note 122 (“I did not see myself as an environmentalist in
the sense that I was an advocate in front of various government agencies or in society as a whole for government
action on behalf of the environment. . . . I have never been part of the environmental movement and haven’t
thought of myself as such.”); see also Interview by Harold K. Steen, Forest History Soc’y, with Russell E. Train,
Adm’r, EPA, in Wash. D.C., 44–45 (1993), https://foresthistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
Train_Russell_E.ohi_.pdf (“One of the members of the committee, Republican Senator Scott of Virginia, asked
me to explain why in my Who’s Who biography I had listed after my name, ‘environmentalist.’ He said, ‘Weren’t
you a judge in the United States Tax Court?’ I said, ‘Yes, sir.’ He said, ‘Are you ashamed to have been a judge
in the U.S. Tax Court?’ I said, ‘No, sir.’”).
349. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 174.
350. Id. at 201 (footnote omitted).
351. FLIPPEN, supra note 16, at 189–99.
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“If the motivation for his pro-environment initiatives prior to 1973 had been
largely political—with an eye on Muskie and on the 1972 election—as it
probably had been, that motivation had now evaporated,” Train wrote.352 The
primary assault on the Clean Air Act, among other environmental laws, was
waged on the front of energy security.353
Soon after his swearing in, for example, Train recalls being invited by
Nixon to attend a Cabinet meeting focused on the issue of a fuel shortage
forecast for the coming winter.354 Less available oil would necessitate
substitutive coal burning, and Nixon indicated that he believed, being unfamiliar
with the states’ ability to request variances, that it would be necessary to lower
the emission standards overall.355 Train relied on the public health focus of the
Clean Air Act generated by Muskie to stage his defense of the Act, pointing out
the standards’ relevance to “such issues as emphysema, bronchial disorders,
respiratory disease generally, cardiac conditions, and lung cancer.”356 Nixon
responded by noting that “when he was young there were more cases of
tuberculosis from cold houses than from most other causes.”357 Immediately
following the meeting, Nixon and Energy Policy Office Director John Love held
a meeting to call for “a relaxation of air pollution standards.”358
In early 1974, the Nixon White House and OMB released thirteen proposed
Clean Air Act rollback amendments, which would permanently permit tall
smokestacks, allow consideration of economic effects and costs in standardsetting (undoing a key aspect of technology forcing), disallow state preemption
of weaker federal air standards, and exempt all energy production from the
National Environmental Policy Act.
To fight back, Train met with Nixon in an attempt to explain his point of
view; more significantly, he took to the press to broadcast his objections and
undermine Nixon’s rollback strategy. The New York Times reported on the issue
in an article dramatically titled “White House Challenged by Environmental
Chief,” which quoted Train stating, “I want it known that I am strongly opposed
to most of these proposals, and I am going to fight them to the last wire, because
I don’t think they are necessary and I do think they’d do substantial harm,” even
calling the proposed NEPA exemption a kind of “designed emasculation,” which
he “bitterly opposed.”359 Elsewhere, Train doubled down and indicated that he

352. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 163.
353. Russell E. Train: Oral History Interview, supra note 115 (“By then, the bloom was off the
environmental rose and the name of the game was to promote energy supply. This was the Administration’s
viewpoint. So, almost everything was looked upon from the standpoint of whether it promoted or depleted the
nation’s energy supply. The fight over sulphur standards and emissions reflects this emphasis on energy.”).
354. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 162–63.
355. Id. at 162.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 163.
359. Id. at 172.

May 2020]

THE MAKING OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

953

believed he had made his opposition to many of the rollback amendments “pretty
damn clear.”360
Although Nixon’s stance was less clear in 1970, by this point the Times
openly discussed “the President’s well‐known opposition to important segments
of the Clean Air Act when it was passed. At that time, it was said by White
House sources that he came close to vetoing the bill.”361 Should the fight be
litigated before Congress, the Times stated, Train “will have aggressive allies in
Senator Edmund S. Muskie, the Maine Democrat who is chairman of the Senate
subcommittee on environmental pollution, and several of his colleagues.”362
Muskie’s looming presence in the Senate, although no longer sufficient to
force the hand of the White House through the threat of political competition,
was nevertheless a sustained force for backing Train’s EPA as the two fended
off political attacks on the EPA and the Clean Air Act. Train was supported by
the Senate Public Works Committee, with which Train said “it would have been
impossible to have a more supportive relationship,”363 singling out Howard
Baker, Jennings Randolph, and Ed Muskie in particular, who had become a close
friend of Train’s.364 Without both men, it is feasible that the Clean Air Act would
have succumbed to the political vortex of the energy crisis.365
The proposed rollback amendments eventually sent to Congress were
successfully trimmed back by Train’s public adamance,366 and Muskie publicly
ceded credit to Train for “blocking some planned anti-pollution rollbacks.”367
The intentions of the Act were protected, including the EPA’s commitment to
permanent pollution control technology in the form of smokestack scrubbers,
which would become an integral part of the implementation of the Clean Air Act
for stationary sources,368 and another example of the Act’s technological forcing
capabilities.369

360. Id.
361. E.W. Kenworthy, White House Challenged by Environmental Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1974, at 58.
362. Id.
363. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 179.
364. Interview by Don Nicoll with Russell E. Train, former Adm’r, EPA, in Wash., D.C. (May 4, 1999); see
also Interview with Leon Billings, supra note 57 (“He and Muskie got along as well as any two people I ever
met. They would sit there with there [sic] legs crossed, smoking cigars . . . Train would tell Muskie what it was
like dealing with Nixon or Ford, and what he had to do.”).
365. Interview with Russell Train in Wash., D.C. (May 30, 2012).
366. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 173 (“What finally went to Congress represented a compromise between Bill
Simon, . . . the White House, and me.”).
367. Id.
368. Id. at 192 (Train was adamant that “Congress would never approve permanent intermittent controls
(i.e., tall stacks).”).
369. Forcing Technology, supra note 174, at 1722-25 (“Between 1972 and 1974, the feasibility of scrubbers
emerged as the major issue in the struggle between the EPA and the utilities over compliance with SO2 emission
limitations. The agency confronted technical objections in extensive public hearings in 1973 and followed in
1974 with a vigorous enforcement program. Despite the early and well-publicized failures of several scrubber
demonstration programs, the state and federal requirements forced relatively rapid development, demonstration,
and use of workable SO2 control technology” (footnotes omitted)).
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Train would be fated to fight the same battle against energy-driven
rollbacks again against Ford, who nearly resubmitted virtually the same set of
rollback proposals to Congress the following October.370 In the Ford White
House, Train faced a constant battle against the Clean Air Act from others close
to the President.371 Interestingly, though, disputes with the White House were
reported by the Wall Street Journal as “improving Mr. Train’s standing with his
[EPA] troops,”372 who were generally young, enthusiastic environmentalists
with ideological commitment to the mission of the agency.373
Train and the Muskie Subcommittee would later join forces again to
oppose Utah Senator Frank Moss’ proposed Administration-backed amendment
to the Clean Air Act, which would have postponed promulgation of any EPA
regulations pending further study.374 By Train’s evaluation, the EPA, with the
assistance and perpetual presence of the Committee, never lost a major battle in
the fight of energy versus the environment, despite the political forces pointed
against them.375
Much as was the case with Ruckelshaus’ tenure, the courts also influenced
the administration of the Act by EPA under Train. Of primary concern during
Train’s time at the EPA was the issue of cost consideration, given the
extenuating economic and technical circumstances of the recession and oil
crisis.376 After years of the Nixon and Ford Administrations unsuccessfully
working to amend the Clean Air Act to include cost consideration in SIP review,
the issue of cost considerations was brought before the courts in 1976,377 when
three coal-fired power plants in the non-attaining St. Louis area petitioned the
D.C. Circuit Court for relief, alleging that compliance was impossible.378 In
370. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 173-75.
371. Many of whom would become significant players in the GOP in the coming decades, such as Bill
Simon, Paul McCracken, and Roy Ash.
372. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 174.
373. Interview by Harold K. Steen, supra note 348 (“They were young, enthusiastic, highly dedicated
environmentalists and with sometimes an almost evangelical fervor in carrying out their jobs.”).
374. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 211.
375. Russell E. Train: Oral History Interview, supra note 115 (“[B]y and large we were able to hold the line
on all of the environmental legislation and regulations. I think this was a major accomplishment because all the
political strength was really on the energy side.”).
376. See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, supra note 300.
377. We recognize that litigation concerning the feasibility provision began as early as 1972. Union,
however, was the first such case brought before the Supreme Court, and the first significant affirmation of
technology forcing as an enforceable provision of the Act. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495
(4th Cir. 1973) (holding that EPA must either hold feasibility hearings or defer to the State’s record); Buckeye
Power Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he Agency’s argument that technological infeasibility,
high cost-benefit, and resource unavailability are irrelevant under the 1970 Amendments [and are] devoid of
merit.”); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973) (acknowledging that the EPA was prevented
from imposing plans under state plans that were implementing clean air programs); St. Joe Minerals Corp. v.
EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975) (maintaining that the EPA could not approve infeasible SIP regulations); see
also MELNICK, supra note 16, at 213-15 (1983) (“[C]ourts have consistently maintained that the EPA must at
some stage in the administrative process consider the feasibility of control measures needed to meet SIP
requirements.”).
378. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
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response, the court held that “claims of economic and technological infeasibility
could not properly provide a basis for the Administrator’s rejecting a plan.”379
Taken to the Supreme Court, the petitioners from St. Louis similarly found
no relief, and the EPA’s explicit lack of consideration to economic costs was
upheld.380 By asserting that “Congress intended claims of economic and
technological infeasibility to be wholly foreign to the Administrator’s
consideration of a state implementation plan,”381 Justice Thurgood Marshall’s
opinion ratified Congress’ intentions and did much to resolve the language of
the Act and correct the conclusions of the Circuit courts in earlier years. Thus,
“[t]he decision in Union Electric Co. v. EPA affirmed the states’ authority to set
economically or technically infeasible emission limitations where necessary to
achieve NAAQSs.”382
Still, and despite tangential issues resulting from the decision that
complicated enforcement procedures,383 Union represented a qualified victory
and a recognition of the Senate’s intent to force technology and have the Act
applied as a means of inducing innovation and effecting demonstrable change in
favor of the public interest by improving public health metrics.384 Without such
379. Id. at 254.
380. Schoenbrod, supra note 12, at 744-45; see also Forcing Technology, supra note 174, at 1713 n.3
(“[Union] resolved a sharp division among the circuits over the treatment of claims of economic and
technological infeasibility). Compare Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 427 U.S.
246 (1976) and Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975) (economic and technological
infeasibility irrelevant to state plan approval), with St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975),
vacated as moot, 425 U.S. 987 (1976), and Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 168-69 (6th Cir. 1973)
(feasibility must be considered in state plan approval). But see Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1294
(9th Cir. 1977) (9th Circuit ignores Union Electric; requires EPA to show SIP emission limitation “is
economically and technologically feasible.”).
381. Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 256.
382. Forcing Technology, supra note 174, at 1715; see also Schoenbrod, supra note 12, at 769 (“When the
adopted state implementation plans imposed stronger controls on emissions than authorities were later willing
to enforce, the state or EPA could either not enforce the controls, or write compliance schedules that allowed
sources to postpone action or to do less than the plan required.”). But see MELNICK, supra note 16, at 216–17
(describing that Union did not represent an unqualified victory for Train’s EPA or the intention of the Senate
drafters, however, because Justice Marshall conceded several “safety valves,” by the characterization of
Melnick, such as justiciability of “claims of economic or technological feasibility” by the state court, the
consideration of feasibility in issuing administrative orders under Section 113(a) and enforcement proceedings,
and the consideration of those same factors by the courts in determining “appropriate relief”).
383. For greater analysis of this issue, see MELNICK, supra note 16, at 217-20 (analyzing SIP compliance
at district and appellate courts).
384. Kathleen D. Masters, “Can’t Do” Won’t Do: Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976), 1976
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 669 (“Thus, the court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the petition for review because
Union Electric’s claim of newly discovered information was an assertion of economic and technological
infeasibility. Recognition that the Amendments were a drastic remedy to a dire situation played a principal role
in the subsequent analysis by the Supreme Court. The Court read the Amendments and their legislative history
to mean that Congress intended to use the Amendments to ‘take a stick to the states,’ to guarantee that air quality
standards would be promptly attained and maintained. It noted that the Amendments place strict minimum
compliance requirements upon the states, and that these requirements are of a ‘technology-forcing character.’
The Court viewed the Amendments as explicitly contrived to force development of pollution control techniques
that might appear technologically or economically infeasible at the time that the state develops its pollution
control plan” (footnotes omitted)).
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backing from the courts, the central logic of technology forcing promoted by the
Public Works Committee, as discussed above, may have fallen apart, along with
the efficacy of stationary source regulation under the Act.385 Thus Train, much
like Ruckelshaus following the 1973 auto emissions controversy as cited by
Judge Wilkey, was in a position to defer criticism of accepting overly strong
SIPs and say, in essence, that the courts made him do it.
As the Republican Administrations around him became increasingly
disenchanted, Train’s second major contribution to the Clean Air Act was seeing
through what Ruckelshaus began in the form of holding industry to strict
deadlines, which created financial pressure on industry to innovate. Because
Ruckelshaus denied the Title II deadline extension the previous year, and
because the deadlines were set in 1975, the auto industry was effectively forced
to stick with the emissions control technology in development at the time—the
catalytic converter—with the blessing of Train.386 Although neither the Clean
Air Act nor EPA mandated any particular auto technology, the catalytic
converter was presented by automakers as the sole frontrunner technology able
to meet the Act’s statutory auto emissions standards.387
The catalytic converter was no ace in the hole, however. Rare metals
required for the new gadget were difficult to source and could be neutralized by
leaded gas. Furthermore, evidence began to emerge in September 1973 that the
converters produced unknown amounts of potentially harmful sulfuric acid
vapor.388 Eric Stork, leading the “mobile sources” pollution office of the EPA
air quality program, warned of the dangers posed by such a technology as well
as the emissions generated by catalytic converters on a commercial scale.389
At this juncture, Train was forced to make the difficult decision between
taking the risk on catalytic converters or abandoning them, thereby acquiescing
on the Clean Air Act’s Title II deadline and the deadline extension denial of his
predecessor. Allowing EPA to save face, Congress passed the Energy Supply
and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, which punted the deadlines until
1977 and offered a similar one-year deadline extension.390 Train granted the oneyear extension due to latent concerns over the sulfuric acid emissions posed by
the catalytic converter. Although there was emerging evidence that any
emissions were sufficiently small as to pose no real health threat, testimony

385. See generally Gerard & Lave, supra note 21.
386. Interview by Harold K. Steen, supra note 348, at 41–42 (“Actually we never ordered the use of the
converters, we simply ordered the industry to go ahead and meet the standards by a given date, knowing that the
only way they could do it was through the use of catalytic converters. . . . My decision finally was to go ahead
with the catalytic converters.”).
387. Id. at 41.
388. Id. at 41–42 (“[T]he use of a catalytic converter with gasolines that typically contain sulphur would
produce a sulfuric acid aerosol, a very fine mist . . . which would have the ability to penetrate the human lungs
very easily. It was an argument where there were a lot of fears expressed.”).
389. Interview with Eric Stork, in East Falls Church, Va. (May 28, 2012) (on file with authors as Erik Stork
Interview) (describing the “drama” of catalytic converters).
390. Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 791 (2020).
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provided at the deadline hearings gave reason to doubt earlier evaluations.391
Train considered the decision to commit to the catalytic converter, in concert
with the deadline extension, the correct one, despite backlash from the
environmental community.392
Despite granting industry an extension in 1974, Train’s decision on the
auto emissions issue represents no less authority or captaincy than Ruckelshaus’
analogous decisions a few years prior. By maintaining a tough stance and
publicly advocating for the Act’s standards, also allowing Congress to take
responsibility for the deadlines, Train demonstrated that the EPA could balance
risks effectively in consideration of the public health.
In 1972, Ruckelshaus showed that the Clean Air Act and the EPA could be
tough. A few years later, Train needed to show that it could balance discretion
with adamance as the EPA’s bureaucratic structure evolved and further matured
under his leadership. As wide political buy-in was diminished, caution became
increasingly important to prevent broad political backlash against the still-young
EPA and Clean Air Act. By the end of his tenure, Train’s dedication to the Act
and EPA’s mission in general were hardly in question, however. Even “Ralph
Nader admitted having been mistaken in questioning whether [Train] . . . had the
requisite toughness for the job.”393 Both Administrators deserve unqualified
credit in making the Clean Air Act through their tireless work and leadership.
CONCLUSION
As we look back at the Clean Air Act on its fiftieth anniversary, it is easy
to argue that it represents one of the most important environmental laws in the
history of the United States and a watershed moment in the development of
federal environmental law. This assessment rings true when we consider its
impact on our physical environment and on human communities historically
afflicted by polluted air. As Senator Muskie said before the Senate, “we all must
recognize that the quality of our air is most valuable, most essential, to the
quality of our environment and to the quality of our lives upon this planet.”394
We might also credit the Clean Air Act as a first step of the modern
federalization of environmental law and, in many ways, the foundation upon
which the field of environmental law would emerge. Whereas Muskie’s point
was to help focus on the deterioration of the air that would have been familiar to

391. Chrysler Corp., Ford Motor Co., & Gen. Motors Corp., Applications for Suspension of 1977 Motor
Vehicle Exhaust Emission Standards, Decision of the Admin., 40 Fed. Reg. 11,900 (1975).
392. Russell E. Train: Oral History Interview, supra note 115 (“I came down on the side of the catalytic
converter, which, in hindsight, seems to have been the right decision. I like to think it was some great wisdom
on my part, but I can’t remember any great wisdom. In any event, it was a very tough decision. At one point, I
did give the auto industry some additional time to meet the 90 percent reduction. Predictably, I caught all sorts
of hell from the environmental community.”).
393. TRAIN, supra note 2, at 180.
394. See SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REP. OF THE CONF. COMM. (Dec. 18, 1970), reprinted in 1 COMM.
ON PUB. WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS, 1970, at 130 (1974).
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Americans at the time, we today might similarly point to the improvements in
air quality since the passage of the Clean Air Act in retrospect.
As a measure of our appreciation of the enactment, however, we ought to
take time to recognize the key players who made it a reality. Senator Baker
expressed his feelings on the Clean Air Act nearly thirty-five years after its
passage, speaking on the accomplishments of the Senate Public Works
Committee achieved through the Act’s passage:
We triggered a global change. As a result of our investment and the collective
effort of a few committed men who gathered in a small committee meeting
room, we charted a change in the course of history.

....
Special interests today can weaken the law. They can change the law. But in
the final analysis they won’t roll back the continued commitment worldwide
to emission reductions which we initiated 35 years ago.395

Many people responsible for the global shift created by the Clean Air Act,
including Senator Baker, have often been unfortunately overlooked, but, to the
extent that the Clean Air Act is worth celebrating at its golden anniversary, our
celebration should honor the legacies of those who made it what it is today. The
Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee in full, its staff, Administrators
Ruckelshaus and Train, and many within the Nixon Administration have earned
a place in the narrative of the making of the Clean Air Act.

395. Howard Baker, Ambassador to Japan, Address at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (Mar. 9,
2005), http://www.muskiefoundation.org/baker.030905.html.

